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ABSTRACT
REDUCING DISPARITY IN JUDICIAL SENTENCING:
A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH
by
SIEGFRIED LUDWIG SPORER 
University of New Hampshire, 1980
Researchers from diverse disciplines— e.g. 
sociologists, criminologists, political scientists, legal 
observers, and most recently also psychologists— have 
studied judicial sentencing. More than half a century of 
research, employing multiple methodologies, strongly 
demonstrates that the unguided use (or abuse) of discretion 
has frequently led to vast disparity in judicial sentencing; 
i.e. large variations among sentences given for highly 
similar offenses and/or offenders. Among the various reform 
proposals reviewed, sentencing councils have been suggested 
as a constructive solution to reduce sentencing disparity 
without abandoning judicial discretion or displacing 
disparity to other agents in the criminal justice system.
The present research attempts to demonstrate the 
disparity reducing effect of discussion in sentencing 
councils in a controlled laboratory setting. From a social 
psychological perspective, sentencing a criminal offender
xii
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
can be conceptualized as judging an ambiguous stimulus 
object. Convergence toward the mean of the sentencing 
decisions (reduction of variability) was predicted as a 
function of group discussion in line with theories of norm 
formation processes (e.g. Moscovici, 1974; Sherif, 1935, 
1936; Sherif & Sherif, 1969). Discussion of goals of 
judicial sentencing was expected to further reduce 
variability. Also of interest was whether or not writing 
down the sentencing decision prior to discussion would make 
judges less susceptible to group influence processes. In 
line with the polarization hypothesis (Moscovici &
Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & Lamm, 1976; Lamm & Myers, 1978), 
penalty shifts (leniency or severity) were also predicted as 
a function of group discussion.
Extending the Solomon-four-group design, this study 
crossed three levels of the council factor (no council, 
council, and extended council) with two pretest conditions 
(no pretest and pretest). College students (N = 277) 
simulated mock judges who were presented a description of a 
case of armed robbery. As predicted, variability within 
councils was considerably less as a function of discussion 
in three-member councils and this effect was stronger for 
mock judges who had not written down their sentences than 
for those who had committed themselves that way. There were 
no differences in within council variability between the 
council and the extended council condition but somewhat less 
overall variability was observed in the extended council
xiii
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condition as compared to the no-council condition. There 
was no evidence for leniency and/or severity shifts.
The reduction of variability findings provide strong 
support for the postulation of norm formation processes as 
function of qroup discussion. The observed commitment 
effect, and its absence in the no-pretest conditions, are 
also compatible with this interpretation. Contrasting 
traditional inductive approaches to validity with more 
recent deductive approaches, the applicability of these 
theoretical principles to real world sentencing councils is 
argued. The implementation of sentencing councils on a 
trial basis, in which council members do not write down 
their sentences before discussion, is recommended. 
Sentencing councils would be expected to reduce sentencing 
disparity to some extent but would have to be supplemented 
by other structural and procedural innovations that could 
also be investigated within the theory-testing 
interventionist approach promulgated here.
xiv
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
C H A P T E R  I
SENTENCING DISPARITY: THE KEY PROBLEM IN JUDICIAL SENTENCING
The Need for Studying Judicial Sentencing 
Historically, back to the earliest stages of psychology 
as an independent discipline, there has been a mutual 
interest of legal scholars and psychologists in each others' 
disciplines. Legal scholars have looked to psychology for 
answers they regarded to be of a psychological nature, and 
psychologists have been eager to analyze some of the legal 
issues of interest to them. Periods of enthusiasm have 
given way to periods of disillusionment, and vice versa. 
Throughout these periods of interaction, the scope of the 
type of issues being addressed has always been restricted to 
a relatively narrow set of topics (see, for example Arntzen, 
1980; Gross, 1908; Munsterberg, 1907; Tapp, 1976; 
Undeutsch, 1967).
Only most recently has there been an upsurge in 
research at the interface of psychology and the law that has 
exploded the topical boundaries of the past. Continually 
more issues are being tackled by psychological 
investigators, especially within the criminal justice system 
(for a plethora of examples see Bermant, Nemeth, & Vidmar,
1
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21976; Friedman & Macaulay, 1977; Marshall, 1980; Saks & 
Hastie, 1978; Sales, 1977; Shaver, Gilbert, & Williams, 
1975; Tapp & Levine, 1977? Thibaut & Walker, 1975).
Collaborative efforts of the two disciplines are 
becoming institutionalized through the foundation of 
journals and interdisciplinary graduate programs, 
conferences, publications, and research funding (Tapp,
1976) .
Despite this massive extension in scope, research
efforts are not equally distributed over the many issues to
which psychologists could contribute. For example, there is
an abundance of research on one of the key institutions of
the American legal system, the jury, but relatively little
effort is spent on the role of other key figures in the
courtroom, such as the prosecutor and the trial judge (Saks
& Hastie, 1978; Shaver et al., 1975). The trial judge
holds a central position in trial court (Frankel, 1972;
Saks & Hastie, 1978), and it is his/her decision-making
process of arriving at a criminal sentence that is the focus
of this investigation.
The sentencing behavior of the judge is the most
significant of his/her activities, and the reasons for
studying this decision-making process have been succinctly
summarized by Sutton (1978a):
There can be little doubt that, however 
justifiable, the imposition of criminal sentence 
is one of the most substantial intrusions the 
State can effect upon individual liberty. Judges 
are given nearly unparalleled discretion over the 
lives of millions who come before them each year.
Bounded only by the broadest of statutory
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3constraints, the sentencing judge is generally 
empowered to exact penalties ranging from little 
more than verbal reprimand to life imprisonment or 
even death. Although not all offenders face such 
a range of sentences, sentences actually imposed 
for each offense category tend to cover the 
statutorily allowed range. That discretion of 
such formidable consequence should be 
authorized— indeed, that it should be exercised so 
variably— should provide not only a justification 
but a compulsion to examine the manner of its use. 
(p. 1)
Judicial Sentencing, Discretion, and Sentencing Disparity 
The decisional power of the judge is inherent in 
his/her exercise of discretion that allows him/her to arrive 
at decisions in a free and independent manner, only governed 
by his/her conscience and the rules and spirit of the law 
(Shaver et al., 1975). This vast opportunity at discretion 
has led to an often deplored disparity among judicial 
sentences, i.e. large variations among judges in deciding 
upon highly similar offenses and/or similar offenders have 
been frequently observed and amply documented by legal 
scholars, political scientists, sociologists, and 
psychologists (for reviews, see Austin & Utne, 1977; Austin 
& Williams, 1977; Bullock, 1961; Chiricos & Waldo, 1975; 
Cole, 1973; Dershowitz, 1976; Hagan, 1974; Hogarth, 1971; 
Hood & Sparks, 1970; O'Donnell, Churgin, & Curtis, 1977; 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration 
of Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts, 1967; Sporer,
1978; Sutton, 1978a; Zimmerman, 1976).
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4In light of such massive evidence— some more and some 
less conclusive— it is again and again surprising to find 
investigators who feel a need to establish the existence of 
disparity de novo after half-a-century of research on this 
issue. Of course, many of the studies, particularly some of 
the earlier ones, are fraught with methodological problems 
and subject to rival explanations (critically, see Austin & 
Williams, 1977; Chiricos & Waldo, 1975; Diamond & Zeisel, 
1975; Hood & Sparks, 1970; Sutton, 1978a; Zeisel, 1969). 
But the very fact that sentencing disparity has been studied 
with the whole gamut of the methodological armamentarium, 
ranging from collection of anecdotal evidence, case 
histories, in-depth interviews, questionnaire surveys, and 
large scale archival studies to controlled experimental 
simulations, increases our confidence in the existence of 
this phenomenon on the basis of the mutual corroboration 
achieved through triangulation and multiple operationism 
(Diamond & Zeisel, 1975; generally, see Campbell & Stanley, 
1966; Cook & Campbell, 1979; Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & 
Seechrest, 1966; Zeisel, 1969).
This countdown on sentencing disparity should not be 
mistaken as a countdown on judicial discretion, or a call 
for its abolition. To be sure, the issue is not one of 
whether or not to allow discretion at all. Discretion is at 
the heart of our criminal justice system (Davis, 1969;
Shaver et al., 1975; critically, American Friends Service 
Committee, 1971). It is considered essential to guarantee
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
5flexibility in a penal system that attempts to make 
punishment fit not only the crime but also the criminal.
The concern is with abuse of discretion. This abuse of 
discretion runs counter to the constitutionally guaranteed 
right to equality of treatment before the law (cf. Rubin, 
1966; Zimmerman, 1976). The judge's function is then to 
navigate between the Scylla of inequality and the Charybdis 
of rigidity and flexibility.
The evidence accumulated above indicates that the 
pendulum of judicial decision-making has swung too far to 
the side of unrestrained discretion and resulting 
inequality, and that it is time to strike a better balance 
again.
Understanding Sentencing Disparity:
Its Roots in the Statutory Sentencing Framework 
At the very heart, sentencing disparity is a function 
of unguided judicial discretion in the absence of 
"substantive control or guidance" (Kadish, 1962). The 
possibility of abuse of discretion is inherent in the 
judge's power to choose among a great variety of sentencing 
options virtually without legal guidance or control. As 
O'Donnell et al. (1977) have observed:
The lack of "substantive control or guidance" 
for sentencing judges is evident in Title 18 of 
the United States Code, which contains most of the 
federal criminal statutes and penalties. Bereft 
of sentencing standards for judges, this chaotic 
patchwork of penalties authorized by individual 
statutes, enacted at different times and having no
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6relationship to each other, has established a 
bizarre range of penalties for an enormous variety 
of criminal activities.(p. 1, notes omitted)
This chaotic state of affairs observed at the federal level
is reflected, and probably exacerbated, at the state level
(Frankel, 1972). Consider for a moment the vast array of
sentencing alternatives, subject of regional modifications,
a sentencing judge can choose, including combinations
thereof (cf. President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
the Administration of Justice, 1967):
He/she can decide
—  whether or not to impose a fine;
  the magnitude of the fine;
—  whether to incarcerate the offender or put him/her on 
probation
  the maximum length of the prison term;
  the minimum length of the prison term (parole
eligibility):
  the length of the probation sentence;
—  whether or not to sentence the offender under the Youth 
Corrections Act, or similar provisions for subpopulations 
of offenders;
—  whether or not to commit the offender for observation and 
study, or psychiatric examination etc.;
—  whether or not to suspend a sentence.
This wide range of sentencing alternatives provided by 
statutory sentencing frameworks of the individual states 
allows for maximum flexibility of the judge to fit the
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7punishment to the individual offender and the circumstances 
of the crime. This individualized treatment model of 
sentencing had its historical origins in the rise of the 
rehabilitative ideal during the post-Civil War period, and 
progressed through the adoption of indeterminate sentencing 
laws by many states in this country (for a review of the 
historical development, see Dershowitz, 1976; Rothman,
1977) . Until most recently, almost all the states had some 
form or another of a mixed sentencing model which, in 
essence, is a compromise between legislatively fixed, 
judicially fixed and administratively fixed sentencing 
models (Dershowitz, 1976).
For example, a sentencing judge who is to decide a 
felony case (e.g. armed robbery) for which the legislature 
has provided a sentencing range from seven-and-one-half to 
fifteen years in that particular state may sentence the 
defendant to eight years minimum to twelve years maximum of 
imprisonment, leaving the ultimate decision of release of 
the defendant to the parole board. The parole board, in 
turn, may schedule the first parole meeting after about 
five-and-one-half years, i.e. the minimum sentence minus 
the amount of "good time" credit which may be forfeited as a 
function of misbehavior in prison (see American Bar 
Association Commission on Correctional Facilities and 
Services, 1974). Thus, a substantial amount of discretion 
is vested in the decisional power of both sentencing judge 
and the parole board, and consequently the possibility of
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
8disparate outcomes ensues at both institutional decision 
points. Although the present study focuses on the 
discretionary power of the sentencing judge, it will be wise 
to keep in mind that the judge's decisions are being made 
within the court as a system (e.g. Saks & Hastie, 1978). 
Therefore, they are both dependent upon, and determinants of 
the actions of other criminal justice agents, especially the 
prosecutor and correction officials (e.g. parole boards).
Unguided discretion of judges and/or parole boards had 
its heyday under indeterminate sentencing laws, e.g. in 
California, and the subsequent disillusionment with the 
individualized treatment model and rehabilitation outcomes 
(e.g. American Friends Service Committee, 1971; Fogel, 
1979; Martinson, 1974; Mitford, 1973; Orland, 1979) has 
led more and more states to shift toward the opposite 
direction of various forms of determinate sentencing' (see 
Alschuler, 1978; Bagley, 1979; Dershowitz, 1976; Fogel, 
1979; von Hirsch, 1976; Orland, 1979; Interim Report of 
the Sentencing Study Committee to Florida Supreme Court, n. 
d.; Lagoy, Hussey, & Kramer, 1978; Twentieth Century Fund 
Task Force on Criminal Sentencing, 1976). Legislative 
changes such as these and their actual and potential impact 
will have to be taken into account in the interpretation of 
an empirical analysis of sentencing behavior.
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9Types of Sentencing Disparity
Some of the confusion about some of the differences in 
findings of previous research on sentencing disparity have 
arisen from the failure to take regional and temporal 
variations into account (Hindelang, 1969; Sutton, 1978a). 
Many of the studies on judicial sentencing are rather 
limited in scope, often focusing on a limited number of 
offenses within specific jurisdictions within a limited time 
period, making comparisons among them rather difficult 
(Sutton, 1978a). Therefore, it is suggested that an 
analysis of the study of sentencing variations should pay 
attention both to the level of analysis (regional scope), 
and the time dimension of the study.
S' ■
Levels of analysis and time may be conceived of as two 
orthogonal dimensions within each of which several further 
distinctions can be made. Within the time dimension, we may 
conveniently distinguish between relatively short-term and 
relatively long-term variations in sentencing. For example, 
a single judge may give different sentences to highly 
similar offenses and/or highly similar offenders as a 
function of (short-term) situational variables such as the 
previous case sentenced (Pepitone & DiNubile, 1976). On the 
other hand, his/her sentencing behavior may change as a 
function of the number of years on the bench (Hogarth,
1971) , or in the course of long-term historical-political 
changes (e.g. Rothman, 1977).
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With regard to the levels-of-analysis dimension, 
several levels may be distinguished (see also Hogarth, 1971, 
for a somewhat different distinction). At the highest most 
encompassing levels, i.e. at the cross-cultural and 
cross-national levels, one would most obviously expect quite 
different sentencing practices in different societies (e.g., 
compare the penal codes of different countries; see also 
Hood & Sparks, 1970). At the next lower level, sentencing 
variation across states within the United States (or 
Provinces in Canada) has been repeatedly noted for the 
Federal Court System (e.g. Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts, 1972; Frankel, 1967; Frankel, 1972; 
Hogarth, 1971; President's Commission of Law Enforcement 
and the Administration of Justice, 1967; Sutton, 1978c; 
Tiffany, Avichai, & Peters, 1975). For the State Court 
System, geographical variations across states is obviously 
necessitated by the differences in sentencing that are 
legislatively fixed for each individual state (Seymour,
1977) .
One notch below this level, one may observe variations 
across districts within a single state, i.e. among courts 
under the same statutory authority (Hogarth, 1971; Jaffary, 
1963, cit. in Hogarth, 1971; Zimmerman, 1976). At the 
lowest level of analysis, focusing on the individual as the 
unit of analysis, variations across individual judges within 
a single court (or within a state, or even across cultures) 
have frequently been studied (e.g. Gaudet, 1933, 1938,
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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1949; Gaudet, Harris, & St. John, 1934; Green, 1961;
Hogarth, 1971; Nagel, 1962; Schubert, 1977; Smith &
Blumberg, 1967; Winick, Gerver, & Blumberg, 1961).
Many of the latter approaches essentially employ an
individual differences approach which is geared to
discovering the "personal equation", i.e. personality
traits, attitudes, etc. that may be useful in predicting
sentencing decisions. Hood & Sparks (1970) and Hogarth
(1971) review some of these studies and criticize the
circularity of reasoning characteristic of some of them.
In studies of this kind, differences in sentencing 
beviour which cannot be explained by known 
differences in the kind of cases dealt with, are 
usually attributed to the "policies," "attitudes," 
or even the "personalities" of the judge or 
magistrate concerned. Thus, punitive judicial 
attitudes are inferred from apparently punitive 
sentencing behaviour. Judges are said to be 
"tough-minded," tender-minded," "conservative," 
"liberal," "rigid," or "prejudiced," because their 
sentences appear to be so. To infer judicial 
attitudes indirectly from judicial conduct and not 
from specially designed questionnaires can lead to 
circularity in reasoning. It is arguable that one 
should not, by observing sentencing behaviour, 
impute an attitude and then employ that attitude 
to explain the behaviour, but this is precisely 
what most of these studies appear to do.
(Hogarth, 1971, p. 10)
Other studies within this general category have been 
criticized by Sutton (1978a) for committing the "ecological 
fallacy." Sutton's criticism also stresses the importance of 
the levels-of-analysis distinction introduced here.
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Towards a Definition of Sentencing Disparity 
The above distinctions have important implications for 
a definition of sentencing disparity. A rational discussion 
of sentencing disparity will benefit from a consensus on the 
type of sentencing disparity (i.e. what level of analysis 
is being discussed). Although the terms disparity, 
variability, and variation will be used here 
coterminously— except when the latter refers to a 
statistical term— it should be noted that not every 
variation in sentencing necessarily deserves the label 
"disparity." For example, variations across cultures or 
nations are usually not denoted as disparities although 
comparative analyses at this level also contribute to our 
understanding of sentencing practices. But more 
importantly, the term sentencing disparity has negative 
emotional overtones, and for many experts it usually 
connotes inequality before the law, unfairness and 
injustice. Zimmerman (1976) has summarized this issue 
succinctly:
The word "disparity" has been much used and 
abused. Sentencing disparity is best 
characterized as unwarranted or unwanted 
variability in sentencing; it assumes that there 
should be relative consistency in sentencing after 
legitimate differences among cases have been 
accounted for. The problem, of course, centers 
around the definition of legitimate differences...
(p. 18)
"Legitimate" differences are generally accepted when 
they arise as a function of "legal factors" (Sporer, 1978, 
1979, 1980) such as the type of offense or the number of
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prior convictions of the offender (although the latter is 
occasionally debated; cf. Frankel, 1972). However, even 
some of these legal factors may lead to disparate results in 
sentencing outcomes in the absence of guidelines to 
determine the weight they should be given in the sentencing 
decision (Frankel, 1972; Twentieth Century Fund Task Force 
on Criminal Sentencing, 1976). There is also a 
middle-ground of factors subject to legal dispute, e.g. a 
guilty plea vs. insistence on the right to trial, or the 
number of prior arrests (not convictions), which make the 
distiction between legal and extra-legal factors at times 
difficult.
To arrive at stringent estimates of the magnitude of 
sentencing disparity, as many of these factors as possible 
will have to be controlled. Archival studies that have 
attempted to control for many of these variables through 
"matching" (the so-called "comparable case" method, Diamond 
& Zeisel, 1975) approximate this ideal but can always be 
criticized because it will never be possible to know all the 
possibly relevant variables and to control for them (Austin 
& Williams, 1977; Diamond & Zeisel. 1975; Hood & Sparks, 
1970; Partridge & Eldridge, 1974). The only method that 
allows us to estimate the true magnitude of disparity is the 
"identical case" method (Diamond & Zeisel, 1975), i.e. a 
"true experiment" (Campbell & Stanley, 1966; Cook &
Campbell, 1979), in which identical cases are randomly 
assigned to different judges whose sentences can then be
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directly compared.
The present investigation has used the latter approach, 
and disparity will be defined accordingly as the variation 
among individual judges sentencing an identical case 
(identical offender convicted of an identical crime).
Within the levels-of-analysis and time dimension framework 
suggested above, this definition addresses the issue of 
disparity among individual judges within a single court and 
also more generally among judges within the same statutory 
authority at a particular point in time.
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CHAPTER II
REDUCING SENTENCING DISPARITY: 
PROPOSALS FOR SENTENCING REFORM
Legal journals, scholarlyjbnd popular books, and 
governmental and administrativenreports frequently make 
suggestions for changing the judicial sentencing structure. 
They are so numerous that it W'aTild be impossible to review 
them all here. Most of the arguments advanced are highly 
repetitious, and very seldom supported by empirical 
evidence. However, most of th^ fii seem to have one thing in 
common: They do acknowledge th&t sentencing disparity does
exist— to some greater or lesser extent— and that it has had 
negative consequences for the criminal justice system and 
the public's perception thereof-i Therefore, many of these 
proposals constitute attempts to reduce sentencing disparity 
in one form or another, or to impose some external check on 
sentencing decisions. The mosticommon proposals are briefly 
outlined here, along with some/of the drawbacks and common 
criticisms thereof.
15
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Determinate Sentencing
During the last few years, about half a dozen states 
have replaced the former indeterminate sentencing laws with 
various forms of determinate sentencing provisions (e.g. 
Maine, California, Arizona, Illinois and Indiana), and about 
another half a dozen other states are considering similar 
legislation (cf. Bagley, 1979; Gettinger, 1977; Orland, 
1979; Serrill, 1977). These legislative reforms are a 
response to the general disillusionment with the 
rehabilitative model inherent in indeterminate sentencing, 
offering instead a justice model ("justice-as-fairness," 
Fogel, 1979) and "fair and certain punishment" (Twentieth 
Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing, 1976).
Determinate sentencing exists in various forms, such as 
mandatory or minimum mandatory, flat-time, and presumptive 
sentencing, each curbing discretion of the sentencing judge 
to varying degrees. However, it would be illusory to 
believe that this would end the disparity problem. More 
likely, discretion will simply be displaced from judges and 
parole boards to legislators, prosecutors and prison 
discipline committees (Alschuler, 1978; Interim Report of 
the Sentencing Study Committee to the Florida Supreme Court, 
n.d.; Orland, 1979). Thus, the "sledgehammer" approach of 
determinate sentencing may easily backfire by raising the 
bargaining power of the prosecuting attorney even further, 
an already serious problem and a thorn in the public's eye 
(Alschuler, 1978; President's Commission on Law Enforcement
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and Administration of Justice, 1967; Saks & Hastie, 1978; 
for a somewhat more optimistic perspective, see von Hirsch, 
1976; generally, on plea-bargaining, see Law and Society 
Review, 1979, whole issue). From a somewhat different 
perspective, determinate sentencing laws also indicate a 
shift of responsibility away from the judiciary to 
legislative organs of society. Well-intended as some of 
these proposals may be, that attempt to reduce the 
incarcerative tendencies of the present system (e.g. von 
Hirsch, 1976; Twentieth Century Fund Task Force in Criminal 
Sentencing, 1976) they may easily fail when they are forced 
to face up to public pressure toward crime control through 
even longer prison sentences (zimring, 1976, cit. in 
Interim Report of the Sentencing Study Committee to the 
Florida Supreme Court, n.d.). Not only would this overcrowd 
the prisons even more, but it would also throw us back to a 
rigid and inhumane sentencing structure in which the 
punishment only fits the crime but not the criminal.
Appellate Review of Sentencing
Much of the criticism of the disparity problem cited
above are directed at the fact that
at present the United States is the only nation in 
the free world where one judge can determine 
conclusively, decisively, and finally the minimum 
period of time a defendant must remain in prison, 
without being subject to any review of his 
determination. (Chief Judge Kaufman, 1964, cit. 
in O'Donnell et al., 1977, p. 1)
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It seems obvious that appellate review of sentencing or 
some other sentencing review board has been frequently 
suggested to ameliorate this problem (e.g. among many 
others: Frankel, 1972; Gaylin, 1974; Morris & Hawkins,
1977; O'Donnell et al., 1977; D'Esposito, 1969;
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration 
of Justice, 1967). However, unsettled issues remain: Who
should do the reviewing— the already overburdened appellate 
courts or a sentencing review panel (as for example, in 
Georgia or New Hampshire)? Should the reviewing court be 
only allowed to reduce the sentence (creating the 
possibility of frivolous appeals), or also be allowed to 
increase it (critically, see Frankel, 1972; Gaylin, 1974; 
cf. also D'Esposito, 1969, n. 92, for constitutional 
objections regarding double jeopardy)? There are also some 
additional problems related to the fact that Appellate Court 
judges are generally trained to decide on matters of law, 
not sentencing policy, and that they are too removed from 
the trial and the defendant who is not given the possibility 
of allocution (cf. O'Donnell et al., 1977). Last but not 
least, appellate review may be regarded as an insufficient 
solution to the disparity problem because it can only remedy 
the problem after the fact— a time-consuming process— but 
never prevent it.
On the other hand, the possibility of review may 
refrain judges from excessive sentencing decisions, 
especially when they are required to put their reasons for
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their decision into writing a sentencing opinion. Appellate 
reviews may also be helpful in the establishment of 
sentencing guidelines which could aid judges to structure 
judicial discretion.
Sentencing Guidelines 
Another response to the lack of control in judicial 
sentencing power is the call for sentencing guidelines and 
explicit sentencing criteria. O'Donnell et al. (1977) and
the Sentencing Study Committee to the Florida Supreme Court 
(Interim Report, n.d.) have recently elaborated some 
detailed proposals that make use of the positive aspects of 
many of the earlier suggestions and at the same time try to 
minimize some of the weaknesses of them. One of the 
positive features of these proposals is that they preserve 
discretion and the possibility of flexible individualization 
while at the same time subjecting these decision-making 
processes to legislative guidelines. They also require of 
these decision-making processes that they be made explicit 
and therefore subject to public inspection and judicial 
review.
For example, the Proposed Federal Sentencing Statute 
described by O'Donnell et al. requires an explicit brief 
statement of reasons for the sentence imposed as part of the 
record on a routine basis, to be disclosed to the defendant 
at the time of sentencing. This proposal also requires 
explicit consideration of the goals of sentencing, i.e.
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deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and 
denunciation. The development of the guidelines with 
respect to recommended normal sentence is delegated to an 
independently established United States Commission on 
Sentencing and Corrections.
These proposals open some new avenues, t.he consequences 
of which can hardly yet be anticipated. They offer some 
distinct advantages, especially when coupled with some of 
the other approaches that deserve attention in the future. 
One of the key problems underlying this approach, as well as 
the presumptive sentencing approach to which it is similar, 
does not seem adequately faced: For one thing, this
approach presupposes an adequate detailed taxonomy of 
criminal behavior which we simply do not possess, and 
secondly it presupposes a knowledge of adequate criteria for 
the prediction of dangerousness of offenders which are 
similarly nonexistent (on the prediction of dangerousness, 
see Levine, 1977; Monahan, 1976; Monahan & Hook, 1978;
Shah, 1978) . The latter problem, of course, is a dilemma 
faced by any approach to sentencing and can therefore not be 
held against a singular reform effort.
Other Approaches 
Numerous other approaches have been suggested to remedy 
the sentencing disparity problem at one time or another. 
Suggestions include a more careful selection of judges, a 
better training and education of judges, continuing
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
21
education of judges, e.g. through sentencing institutes on 
various sentencing issues; improvements in presentence 
investigations and presentence reports; continual feedback 
to judges; information storage and retrieval systems, among 
many others. Some of these suggestions have more 
far-reaching implications than others, and some of them may 
be very useful in ameliorating sentencing dispartiy. It 
would be impossible to discuss them here in any detail. 
However, there is one other institution that has been 
frequently suggested: sentencing councils. I shall first
describe some of the operating characteristics of sentencing 
councils and then examine some of the claims that have been 
made for their effectiveness.
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CHAPTER III
SENTENCING COUNCILS
Sentencing Councils vs. Sentencing Tribunals 
Before I give a description of sentencing councils, it 
will be necessary to distinguish them from sentencing 
tribunals (Frankel, 1972). In sentencing tribunals, the 
responsibility of sentencing is taken away from a single 
individual and laid in the hands of a sentencing tribunal 
(usually three members) who are to arrive jointly at a 
sentencing decision. Tribunals may not only consist of 
judges but also contain other "experts"— such as 
sociologists, psychologists, or educators (Frankel, 1972; 
Glueck, 1936)— whose special knowledge is considered 
beneficial to an optimal disposition of a defendant.
However, recent research into the prediction of 
dangerousness and the vicissitudes of rehabilitation (cf. 
Chapters I and II) makes it unlikely that any professional 
would be agreed upon to be especialy equipped for the 
sentencing task. Therefore, this somewhat idealistic notion 
is not likely to find many supporters.
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A second notion underlying the sentencing tribunal is 
more fundamental: In sentencing tribunals, the decisional
power is taken away from the individual judge, and delegated 
to the tribunal as a collective. In sharp 
contradistinction, in sentencing councils the sentencing 
decision remains solely in the hands of the individual 
sentencing judge; the council's function is purely 
advisory. Thus, the judge's constitutionally guaranteed 
upon independence of judgment is not impaired. This makes 
the sentencing council a more palatable candidate for reform 
within the present constitutional framework.
Description of Sentencing Councils 
Motivated by the awareness of the injustices created by 
sentencing disparity that were revealed at sentencing 
institutes (Hosner, 1970), federal court judges of the 
Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit) started to convene at 
a regular basis to share their sentencing problems. Shortly 
thereafter, these meetings were formally instituted as 
sentencing councils consisting of three judges. Council 
membership was rotated so that judges partook in different 
councils at different times. Soon other districts followed 
suit, and sentencing councils of various sizes (temporarily 
from two to nine judges) were created by the Eastern 
District of New York in 1962, the Northern District of 
Illinois in 1963, and recently, the District of Oregon 
(Diamond & Zeisel, 1975); Frankel, 1972).
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Parsons (1964) described the procedure typically
followed by the Eastern District of Michigan, and emulated
by other districts:
Under the practice of our district, these meetings 
are held for an hour in the morning, before the 
commencement of the day's routine, when the judges 
may give the matters their undivided attention.
The judges meet in panels of three, each judge 
having the presentence investigation report from 
the probation department and having prepared a 
study sheet, not only for the offenders he must 
sentence, but also for those who are the primary 
responsibility of the other two judges.
Customarily, the one judge will call his first 
case, merely stating the name of the offender and 
giving a brief statement of the offense. He will 
then state to his brother judges the factors in 
his judgment, believed to be controlling as to 
disposition, and will recommend a disposition to 
be made. Each of the other two judges will then 
give, in turn, the factors believed by him to be 
controlling, together with his recommended 
sentence. The sentences wil normally vary, 
although I have observed with a great deal of 
interest that the sentences of judges working 
together in this manner tend, as times goes on, to 
approach a common ground. It is in the discussion 
following the recommedation as to sentencing that 
the Council performs its most useful function....
The weights assigned the various factors thought 
to be controlling as to disposition of the case 
are sometimes modified by the sentencing judge in 
the light of the experience of his brother judges 
with their own previous sentences. (p. 431-432)
This description of three-member councils characterizes
the prototype of sentencing council procedures, although
there are some regional variations. Participants in
sentencing councils have reported on their successes with
great enthusiasm (e.g. Doyle, 1961; Hosner, 1970; Levin,
1969; Smith, 1963; Zavatt, 1967), and various authors and
agencies have recommended them for widespread use (e.g.
American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for
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Criminal Justice, 1971; Frankel, 1972; National Advisory 
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: 
Corrections, 1973; President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967; critical: 
Interim Report to the Sentencing Study Committee to the 
Florida Supreme Court, n.d.).
A Preliminary Evaluation of Sentencing Councils
The goal of sentencing councils is not necessarily 
total uniformity in sentencing but rather the mutual 
exchange of ideas on sentencing philosophies which should 
lead to the development of sentencing standards. They 
should also provide a safeguard against excessive sentences 
on either side of the scale. Sentencing councils have also 
been claimed to have reduced sentencing disparity,at least 
among judges within a given jurisdiction (i.e. at the 
lowest level of analysis in terms of our analysis proposed 
above; Hosner, 1970; Levin, 1969; Smith, 1963; Zavatt, 
1967) . Additionally, they supposedly have resulted in less 
severe sentences, especially in terms of an increased 
tendency to utilize nonincarcerative sentencing alternatives 
(e.g. probation; Levin, 1969; Zavatt, 1967).
The latter tendency would also indicate a desirable 
feature in the view of other recent reform committees (e.g. 
von Hirsch, 1976; Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on 
Criminal Sentencing, 1976). Hosner (1970) has pointed out 
that the council proceedings had additional positive effects
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on the work of the probation office and specifically the 
preparation of presentence reports when probation officers 
were present in council hearings and could in this way learn 
how their information was utilized by the judges for their 
sentencing decisions. More generally, he praised the 
improvement of the relationship between judges and 
corrections as a function of the interchanges between judges 
and probation officers.
It should be noted however, that all the above claims 
are based on "insider's" evaluations. We know from the 
growing body of literature on research on program evaluation 
about the limitations of inside evaluations (see Anderson & 
Ball, 1978). The richness of informal observations does not 
outweigh the advantages of detached, objective assessment 
that modern evaluation research requires. Many of the 
observations provided by these authors are rather informal, 
such as illustrative descriptions of cases in which 
sentencing councils were especially beneficial. Some of the 
reports do present data obtained from court records and/or 
abstracted from records kept on the council meetings (Levin, 
1969; Zavatt, 1967) but the data are only descriptive 
statistics indicating the number of cases dealt with by the 
sentencing councils, or the number and kind of changes from 
the initial recommendations of the presiding judges to their 
final dispositions. The data are provided over several 
years of the councils' operation.
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These data are useful summary statistics but pose 
severe methodological restrictions on their interpretation. 
The claims are not stated as falsifiable hypotheses, and are 
not subjected to rigorous statistical tests. Although 
seasonal trends could possibly be inferred on their basis, 
interpretations are severely limited by the plausible rival 
hypotheses threatening pre-experimental or time-series 
designs wihout comparable control groups (Campbell &
Stanley, 1966; Cook & Campbell, 1979).
For example, the increase in proportion of probation 
sentences for the first five years of the council's 
operation at the Eastern District of Michigan (Levin, 1967) 
could be a function of the sentencing council but could also 
be simply a reflection of a general maturational trend 
towards less incarcerative sentences during this time 
period. Only a control series design (Campbell & Stanley, 
1966; Cook & Campbell, 1979) would allow us to rule out 
maturation as a plausible rival hypothesis given that the 
relative frequency of offense categories had also been 
controlled for.
Apart from the difficulties in evaluating some of the 
claimed advantages of sentencing councils more conclusively, 
sentencing councils have the additional advantage that they 
offer an "optimizing strategy" (Zimmerman, 1976) to the 
disparity problem. This approach keeps discretion as a 
vital principal of judicial sentencing intact while at the
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Decision-making in an Ambiguous Stimulus Situation
"There is no decision in the criminal process that is 
so complicated and so difficult to make as that of the 
sentencing judge." (The Challenge of Crime in a Free 
Society— A Report of the President1s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967, p.141) . 
With this quote, John Hogarth opened his classic study on 
the sentencing behavior of magistrates in Ontario, Canada: 
Sentencing as a Human Process (1971) . There could be no 
better description in a few words. Sentencing is a complex 
human decision-making process. In other words, sentencing 
is a psychological decision-making process, determined by 
all the personal and environmental variables that have been 
found to influence any other human decision-making process.
Decision-making processes in the criminal justice 
system are characterized by the principle of discretion 
(Shaver et al., 1975). The principle of discretion is a 
unifying principle that marks an ideal entrance point for
29
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the social-psychological study of legal decision-making
processes. As Shaver et al. (1975) put it:
Although "bounded by rules," the exercise of 
discretion is an individual action, affected by 
the actor's attributions, attitudes, values, 
social status and role, and numerous other factors 
of interest to social psychologists. (p. 472)
But once we recognize the importance of discretion for
a social-psychological analysis where do we go from there?
Which theory or set of theories is most pertinent to an
adequate understanding of sentencing behavior? From
psychophysical scaling to equity theory, from theories of
attitude and opininon change to attribution and information
integration theory, any of these theories may or may not be
relevant (see, for example Austin & Utne, 1977; Pepitone,
1975, 1976).
When we return to our focus on sentencing as a complex 
decision-making process, there is one aspect of the 
sentencing decision that is frequently overlooked: Although
the task of sentencing is relatively well-defined, i.e. 
there is a specified set of decision-alternatives from which 
the judge may choose— see Chapter I— there is no correct 
answer to the problem of finding a sentence best suited to 
the offender for his/her offense at hand. Given the paucity 
of information available to the judge about the offender at 
the time of sentencing, including the general problem of our 
relative inability to predict violence (e.g. Levine, 1977; 
Monahan, 1976; Monahan & Hood, 1978; Shah,1978) , 
sentencing can be best described as an analogue to the
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judgment of an ambiguous stimulus (the defendant and his/her 
actions and life circumstances). The task of the judge 
becomes one of integrating all the relevant information 
about the offender and his/her offense, and to scale it on 
one of several dimensions, e.g. probation or incarceration, 
magnitude of fine, or length of prison sentence.
It has been a long-known fact within the Gestalt 
tradition of social psychology that "the more unstructured 
the external stimulus situation, the greater the 
contribution of internal factors— including internalized 
social values and standards." (Sherif & Sherif, 1969, p.
62). Translated into the context of judicial sentencing, 
this proposition would indicate that in the absence of 
precise sentencing laws (determinate sentences) and in the 
absence of sentencing guidelines, coupled with the scanty 
knowledge about offender and offense, the personality and 
values of the judge, e.g. his/her attitudes and 
particularly his/her sentencing philosophy, would determine 
the sentencing decision. Empirical evidence, both from 
field studies and laboratory simulations corroborate this 
proposition (Hogarth, 1971; McFatter, 1978).
If the assumption of the offender/offense as relatively 
ambiguous stimulus is correct, it should come as no surprise 
that sentencing decisions are as variable as they have been 
documented to be. In analogy to the classic findings with 
the autokinetic effect paradigm (Sherif, 1935, 1936), great 
variability in judgment— e.g. the "magnitude estimation" of
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number of years of imprisonment— would be expected when 
neither reference points (other people's judgments) nor 
guidelines (norms) are present.
This perspective has several advantages. It makes 
sentencing variability an understandable human process, and 
renders discussions about the rationality or irrationality 
in sentencing superfluous (cf. Austin & Utne, 1977; Hood & 
Sparks, 1970). But more importantly, it opens a wide and 
well-established vista of theory and research in social 
psychology that can guide us to find ways to reduce 
sentencing disparity. Of course, the specific parameters 
will have to be fleshed out in more detail before we can 
arrive at useful predictions.
Sentencing Councils and the Social Psychology o_f Groups
The decisional procedure followed by sentencing 
councils: Tentative judgment alone, discussion, judgment
alone by the sentencing judge, is identical to one of the 
oldest research paradigms in experimental psychology (e.g. 
the experiments by Munsterberg, 1914; Allport, 1924;
Jenness, 1933; or last but not least Sherif's classic 
experiments on the production of social norms, 1935, 1936). 
Not only is there a striking match in paradigm but there are 
other similarities as well that make the results of many of 
the studies on conformity arising from the Sherif tradition 
highly relevant for sentencing councils. For example, both 
approaches are usually concerned with the judgment of an
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ambiguous stimulus— here, the offender and his/her 
actions— and the very factors that have been shown to 
operate in the laboratory to create the convergence toward 
the mean— Sherif's famous "funnel-shaped" curve— are likely 
to be at work in sentencing councils as well (for reviews, 
see Hollander, 1971; Lorge, Fox, Davitz & Brenner, 1958; 
Moscovici, 1974; Shaw, 1976; Sherif & Sherif, 1969).
Thus, one interesting finding of the above studies is 
that the newly acquired norm seems to persevere even in the 
absence of the reference group (Hood & Sherif, 1962). In 
our case, the judge, when he/she is by him/herself in making 
up the sentence after the discussion would be expected to 
continue to be influenced by the other council members' 
judgments. Findings from sentencing councils in operation 
in several federal districts (Diamond & Zeisel, 1975;
Levin, 1969; Zavatt, 1967) as well as from a simulation of 
sentencing councils conducted by Zimmerman (1976) confirm 
this proposition. After the discussion, when judges were by 
themselves and had sole responsibility to make the final 
decision, a significant portion of them changed their 
decision from pre-discussion to final disposition. Overall 
changes were reported, in percentages of cases processed by 
councils: 31.9% in the Eastern District of Michigan between
1960 and 1965; 19.8% in the Eastern District of New York,
for the years 1962 through 1964, and 42% for the year 1973; 
33% in the Northern District of Illinois during 1973; and 
43.1% in the simulation study).
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Based on the above findings both from the laboratory 
and the field, it can be expected that relatively more 
judges who participate in sentencing councils will change 
their initial sentence than a control group of judges who 
engage in an alternative activity such as writing a 
sentencing opinion.
Reduction of Variability
If the analogy of the defendant as an ambiguous
stimulus is correct, we would expect that judges' sentencing
behavior would be less variable after discussion of the
defendant's case in the sentencing council. The
observations and archival analyses by Levin (1969) and
Zavatt (1967) have led to claims of this effect but the
evidence these authors present is not conclusive. For
example, Chief Judge Levin's report provides an enthusiasic
description of the workings and accomplishments of the
sentencing council in the Eastern District of Michigan
(Detroit) on its first five years of existence but the only
evidence regarding reduction in disparity he provides is a
commentary on the uniform philosophy that supposedly
developped within this group.
We are getting closer in the developent of a 
uniform philosophy. The meetings consume less 
time now than they did five years ago. The range 
of the varying recommendatins has become 
increasingly narrow. We have particularly 
experienced a substantial decrease in the 
frequency with which the Council is confronted by 
disagreement about the type, rather than the 
quantum, of the sentence. For example, during the 
Council's second year, there were sixty-five cases 
in which one panel member suggested custody and a
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least one other member suggested probation.
During the Council's fifth year, there were only 
about twenty-five cases in which the judges 
disagreed, even initially, on whether custody or 
probation was the proper sentence. (Levin, 1969, 
p. 144)
No further data are given to corroborate these 
conclusions. Therefore, the reader is forced to accept his 
contentions on faith. Similar criticisms apply to Chief 
Judge Zavatt's descriptive report on the functioning of the 
sentencing council in the Eastern District of New York 
(Brooklyn).
A more detailed and methodologically much more rigorous 
analysis of the councils at the Eastern District of New York 
and the Northern District of Ililinois has been conducted by 
Diamond D Zeisel (1975).
These authors have constructed a sophisticated index of 
disparity in their investigation of the Chicago and New York 
district courts. For both courts they found a reduction in 
sentence variability of approximately ten percent.
Two laboratory simulation studies on sentencing 
councils, using law students as mock judges, found even 
greater reduction in sentence variability as a function of 
group discussion (Sporer, 1980b; Zimmerman, 1976). In 
Zimmerman's experiment, this effect was even more pronounced 
for the group decision condition in which the judges, like 
sentencing tribunals, were required to reach a consensus 
within their group. Diamond & Zeisel (1975) have 
constructed a sophisticated index of disparity in their 
investigation of the Chicago and New York district courts.




For both courts they found a reduction in sentence 
variability of approximately ten percent. Zimmerman (1976), 
using law students as mock judges, found even greater 
reduction in variability on a sentence severity scale after 
discussion. The effect was even more pronounced for the 
group decision condition in which the judges were required 
to reach a consensus within their group. However, the 
absolute amounts of disparity reduction of these studies 
cannot directly be compared because they have been obtained 
with different mathematical estimation procedures.
It should be noted here that Zimmerman's (1976) study 
is very close both in approach and methodology to the one 
proposed here. His comprehensive investigation has shed 
light on many important details of functioning in sentencing 
councils. However, it also differs in many respects from 
the study proposed here. Most importantly, Zimmerman's 
experiment addressed the issue of reduction in variability 
only at the within-council level, and thus has limited its 
scope unnecessarily. The present study has in addition 
addressed itself to the equally important issue: whether or
not it is possible to reduce overall sentencing variability 
across a large number of judges by the use of three-member 
councils. Previous investigators and legal commentators 
have failed to see this possibility, or have denied it 
altogether without any evidence (e.g. Interim Report of the 
Sentencing Study Committee to the Florida Supreme Court, 
n.d.) .
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A recent laboratory simulation by Sporer (1980b) has 
shown that it is possible to reduce overall sentencing 
variability across judges as a function of discussion in 
sentencing councils. Using a repeated-measurement design, 
both three- and two-member councils showed significantly 
less variability on the prison sentence and parole 
eligibility measures employed than prior to discussion.
However, all of these previous studies employed 
repeated-measurement designs, and thus do not allow us to 
assess to what extent reduction of variability would (or 
would not) occur if the council participants had not given 
their sentences prior to discussion (i.e. without a 
"pretest"). The present study remedies these deficiencies 
by employing an extension of the Solomon-four-group design 
(Campbell & Stanley, 1966). This design allows one to 
assess the effect of sentencing councils with or without a 
pretest, and in addition the effect of the pretest itself 
and the pretest X council interaction.
In terms of the sentencing council procedure, the 
pretest corresponds to the preliminary sentences judges 
record on their sentencing study sheet (cf. Levin, 1969).
It would be important to know whether sentencing variability 
would be similarly reduced irrespective of whether or not 
the judge had recorded a sentence prior to discussion. The 
act of writing down a tentative sentence could introduce a 
commitment to this particular choice of sentence which would 
make it more resistent to change through group input. The
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Solomon-four-group design employed here is ideally suited to 
explore these various possibilities within a single study.
In sum, it is hypothesized that post-council sentences 
will show less variability than pre-council sentences, and 
that post-council sentences will be less variable than 
sentences meted out by a control group that did not convene 
in sentencing councils. Both hypotheses are proposed to 
hold for variability across judges within councils 
(within-council variability) as well as for variability 
across judges across a whole array of councils 
(across-council variability).
Uniformity in Sentencing Philosophy
It has been variously asserted by proponents of 
sentencing councils that the major function of sentencing 
councils should be and has been to create a more uniform 
sentencing policy (e.g. Levin, 1969; Parsons, 1964; 
Zimmerman, 1976). However, data obtained over several years 
of operation of existing sentencing councils are at best 
equivocal on this issue (cf. Diamond & Zeisel, 1975;
Levin, 1969; Zavatt, 1967) . Methodologically, this claim 
requires a longitudinal design, but at this point there is 
no conclusive evidence supporting this contention.
Therefore Zimmerman was not surprised that he could not 
obtain increases in uniformity in pre-council sentences over 
the short time span of his simulation consisting of nine 
cases.
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However, there is an alternative way to conceptualize 
this issue. "Uniform sentencing policy" is not well defined 
and consequently can mean a variety of things to different 
authors. One aspect that has been repeatedly noted as an 
important determinant of sentencing behavior is the judge's 
sentencing philosophy (e.g. Hogarth, 1971; McFatter, 1978; 
O'Donnell et al., 1977). For example, Hogarth (1971) has 
shown that Canadian sentencing magistrates differ greatly in 
their view on the classic doctrines of criminal sanctions, 
i.e., reformation (rehabilitation), general deterrence, 
individual deterrence, punishment and incapacitation.
Now, provided that such large individual differences 
exist, and that these views are amenable to change, it 
should be possible that an exchange of ideas on judges' 
penal philosophies should reduce some of these differences, 
and hopefully, in turn, reduce sentencing variability. This 
is the notion underlying the implementation of sentencing 
institutes and judicial education. But again, conclusive 
evaluative data on their impact on sentencing are hard to 
come by (cf. Youngdahl, 1969). Therefore, the present 
study attempted to determine the effect of discussion of 
sentencing philosophy directly by testing the effectiveness 
of an "extended sentencing council" that would be induced to 
discuss the goals of sentencing in addition to the 
discussion of the sentences proposed and the specific 
sentencing reasons. It was hypothesized that sentences 
meted out after discussion of sentencing goals in the
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extended council would be less variable than in the "normal 
council" or in the "no-council" control group.
Penalty Shifts (Leniency / Severity Shifts)
Informal observations and archival analyses by Frankel 
(1972), Levin (1969), and Zavatt (1967) tentatively suggest 
that post-council sentences tend to be more lenient than 
pre-council sentences, especially with regard to a more 
frequent choice of probation over prison sentences.
However, these trends are subject to large temporal 
variations, and their interpretation is highly problematic 
(see Chapter III). Other investigators who have adopted a 
social-psychological perspective have attempted to 
re-conceptualize penalty shifts (leniency shifts and 
severity shifts) as particular instances of the polarization 
phenomenon that has frequently been observed as a function 
of group discussion. The group polarization hypothesis 
(originally coined by Moscovici & and Zavalloni, 1969, and 
further promulgated by Moscovici and Doise, 1974, Myers and 
Lamm, 1976, and Lamm & Myers, 1978) is an extension of the 
former "risky" shift and choice shift literature (e.g.
Brown, 1965; Cartwright, 1971; Dion, Baron, & Miller,
1970; Pruitt, 1971a and b). Zimmerman (1976) also applied 
the choice shift literature to laboratory simulations of 
judicial sentencing, leading him to predict a general 
leniency shift tendency as a function of group discussion.
He obtained a leniency shift from prison to probation
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sentences but no reduction in length of sentence. Sporer 
(1980b) obtained significant leniency shifts for both three- 
and two-member councils on a parole eligibility measure but 
not for the prison sentence measure.
A series of other investigators on jury decision making 
some of which incorporated some form of punishment or 
sentencing scales as dependent variables also observed a 
general tendency toward leniency (Davis, Kerr, Stasser,
Meek, & Holt, 1976; Foss & Foss, 1973, cit. in Lamm & 
Myeers, 1978; Gleason & Harris, 1976; Laughlin & Izzett, 
1973; Rumsey, 1976; Rumsey, Allgeier, & Castore, 1978; 
Rumsey & Castore, 1980; Rumsey & Rumsey, 1977; Wahrman, 
1977). Others found evidence for group polarization (i.e. 
both leniency and severity shifts; Bray & Noble, 1978; 
Kaplan & Miller, 1978; Laughlin & Izzett, 1973; Myers & 
Kaplan, 1976; Rumsey & Castore, 1980; Vidmar, 1972). 
Lastly, Heimbach (1970, cit. in Lamm & Myers, 1978) 
observed a severity shift, and Izzett & Leginski (1974) 
obtained a shift toward the middle contrary to the group 
polarization hypothesis. To the extent that these 
experiments on juries are relevant to studies on judicial 
sentencing— juries are more concerned with finding of facts 
and verdicts of guilt or innocence than with sentencing 
decisions (cf. Sporer 1978, 1979; Weiten & Diamond, 1979; 
Vidmar, 1979) —  the present study could shed some light on 
the differences in paradigm in which one would or would not 
expect leniency shifts, severity shifts, or both. Taken
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together, both field and laboratory studies indicate a weak 
general tendency toward a leniency shift as a function of 
group discussion, and could therefore also be expected in 
this experiment. The leniency shift would also be of 
practical importance, considering the pleas for reduction of 
incarcerative sentences by contemporary reformers (see 
Chapter I).
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METHOD
Participants 
Participants were 277 (136 male and 141 female) 
psychology students in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements of an introductory psychology course. They 
were assigned to the experimental conditions. The 
experiment was carried out at fifteen different sessions, 
each with about 15 to 30 students.
Mater ials and Procedure 
Participants were presented with a fictitious case of 
armed robbery for which the defendant had pleaded guilty 
(see Appendix: Case Summary). The defendant was described
to have been convicted of armed robbery once before. The 
case description was modeled after case descriptions 
normally found in presentence reports prepared by the 
probation officer or some other court official (cf. Poulos, 
1976) .
The experimenter (the same for all sessions) introduced 
the experiment as a study in "Legal Psychology," dealing 
with judicial sentencing. Participants received one booklet
43
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containing: (1) A cover page with a short introductory
paragraph and questions to fill in the participant's sex, 
age, and year in school; (2)(a) a pretest assessing the 
participant's sentencing philosophy (Sentencing Philosophy 
Scale, see Appendix: Goals of Sentencing; cf. Hogarth,
1971) in the "pretest" condition, or (b)an alternative 
assessment scale in the "no pretest" condition (an 
acquiescence-free version of the California F Scale (Byrne, 
1974); (3) the case description; (4) in the "pretest"
condition only: a scale for the prison sentence and parole
eligibility decisions (see Chapter VIII on the validity of 
these scales) , rating scales for the confidence in the 
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions, as well as 
rating scales for the offense and the offender; (5) in the 
"pretest" condition only: an Information Checklist; (6) (a)
a Sentencing Opinion Sheet in the "no-council" condition,
(b) a Sentencing Council Instruction to discuss the 
sentences and the reasons for the sentences with the other 
council members ("council" condition), (c) a Sentencing 
Council Instruction to discuss the goals of sentencing, the 
sentences, and the reasons for the sentences given; (7) 
prison sentence and parole eligibility, confidence rating 
and offense and offender scales as in (4) but with slightly 
differring instructions, according to the experimental 
condition; (8) an Information Checklist; (9) the 
Sentencing Philosophy Scale; (10) space for subjecive 
comments.
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In summary, half of the participants were "pretested" 
with regard to their sentencing philosophy, judgment of the 
case and information use prior to the council discussion or 
opinion writing, the other half were administered the 
Authoritarianism Scale (F Scale). Orthogonally, one third 
of the participants wrote a sentencing opinion, one third 
were randomly assigned to three-member sentencing councils 
in which they discussed sentences, and one third were 
assigned to three-member "extended" sentencing councils in 
which they discussed their sentencing philosophies, 
sentences, and reasons for the sentences. Assignment to 
conditions and to groups within conditions was determined 
randomly.
After about 20 minutes of opinion writing/discussion 
participants were (again) asked to judge the defendant. 
Participants in the council conditions were instructed to 
judge the defendant by themselves, "carrying the ultimate 
responsibility and enjoying the constitutionally guaranteed 
independence of judgment."
Participants were then explained the nature and goals 
of the study and thanked for their participation.
Dependent Var iables
The major dependent variables were the prison sentence 
and parole eligibility measures, scaled from 0 to 20 years, 
with 1/2 year intervals. (Although the term parole 
eligibility, with reference to a judge's sentencing
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decision, is technically inappropriate, it does convey the 
decision on the time after which the defendant is likely to 
be "back on the street" to legally relatively 
unsophisticated simulation participants in an unambiguous 
manner; cf. Chapter VII, on dependent variable validity.) 
Sentencing Philosophy ("Goals of Sentencing") was assessed 
with 5-point scales used by Hogarth (1971) . The intervals 
were labeled "very important, quite important, of some 
importance, of little importance, and of no importance." 
Additionally, participants' perceptions of the offender and 
the offense were assessed with 11-point rating scales, as 
well as their confidence in their prison sentence and parole
!
! eligibility decisions.
1 The Information Checklist consisted of a numbered list
of facts all contained in the case participants had read 
previously. Participants rated the facts they found most 
important for their decision separately for prison sentence 
and parole eligibility on a scale from one to five (not at
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RESULTS
Overview of Design and Analyses 
The over-all design of the study was an extension of 
the Solomon-four-group design (Campbell & Stanley, 1966) to 
a six-group design, with the two levels of the pretest 
factor completely crossed with the three levels of the 
council factor. Although there is no single overall way to 
analyze this design (Campbell & Stanley, 1966) , it provides 
several strong tests for the hypotheses advanced here. The 
tests will be described separately for each set of 
hypotheses.
Variability Within Councils 
Between-groups Analyses
To assess the effectiveness of sentencing councils in 
reducing within-council variability, a 3X2 (council X 
pretest) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was 
performed with the posttest standard deviations of prison 
sentence and parole eligibility measures as dependent 
variables. Table 1 shows the mean standard deviations for 
both dependent variables. The MANOVA yielded significant
47
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j
j Mean standard deviations of the
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions for 
i posttest scores for three-member councils (N = 92)




No prison sentence 3.76 2.56 3.12
Council parole eligibility 2.32 1.83 2.06
(n=13) (n=15)
Council prison sentence 2.03 1.42 1.73
parole eligibility 1.32 1.36 1.34
(n=17) (n=16)
Extended prison sentence 2.07 1.25 1.68
Council parole eligibility 1.38 1.01 1.20
(n=16) (n=15)
Marginal means
prison sentence 2.53 1.73
parole eligibility 1.62 1.40
Note. All entries are given in terms of years.
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main effects for both the council (multivariate £(4,170) = 
4.39, £<.002) and pretest variable (multivariate £(2,85) = 
3.53, £<.034). The council main effect was highly 
significant for both prison sentence and parole eligibility 
measures (univariate £(2,86) = 8.48, £<.001 and £(2,86) = 
5.31, £<.007, respectively). As predicted, this effect was 
due to the much lesser variability observed for the council 
conditions as opposed to the no-council conditions, as 
revealed by an a priori special comparison between the 
no-council condition and the combined council and extended 
council conditions (multivariate £(2,85) = 8.63, £<.001; 
univariate tests for prison: £(1,86) = 15.98, £<.001; and
for parole: £(1,86) = 10.10, £<.002). The differences
between the council and the extended council condition were 
not significant (all F's<l).
The main effect observed for the pretest was 
significant for the prison variable (£(1,86) = 7.01, £<.01), 
but not for parole eligibility (£(1,86) = 1.28, n.s.). 
Pretested groups showed, on the average, significantly 
larger variability in prison sentences than non-pretested 
groups. The difference for parole eligibility was in the 
same direction. The council X pretest interaction was not 
significant (all £'s<l). The latter interaction mormally 
ought to be interpreted with caution if one adjusts the 
probability level for the fact that two dependent variables 
were employed in the absence of a multivariate test. But 
the pattern of results was exactly parallel for both
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dependent variables rendering interpretation of this 
interaction unproblematic.
Repeated-measures Analyses
Approximately one-half of the participants judged the 
defendant both before and after council discussion (writing 
a sentencing opinion in the no-council condition). For this 
half of the extended Solomon-four-group design, it is 
possible to assess the direct effects of the council 
intervention and of the pretest, as well as their possible 
interaction. For this purpose two univariate analyses of 
variance (ANOVA's) with group standard deviations of the 
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions were 
conducted, resulting in a 3X2 (council X time) design, with 
repeated measures (before/after discussion (opinion 
writing)) on the second factor. Table 2 shows the mean 
standard deviations for both variables.
The pattern of results is highly similar for both 
variables. While there were no main effects for the council 
variable (prison: F(2,43) = 1.76, n.s.; parole: F(2,43) =
1.75), both "time" and the time X council interaction were 
highly significant for both prison and parole variables. 
Prison sentences varied considerably less after the council 
discussion (time main effect: F(l,43) = 18.60, £<.001;
time X council interaction: F(2,43) = 6.21, £<.004), and
the same held true for the parole eligibility measure (time 
main effect: £(1,43) = 7.50, £<.009, time X council
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Table 2
Mean standard deviations of the 
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions before and after 
council discussion / opinion-writing (N = 46)




No prison sentence 3.62 3.77 3.69
Council parole eligibility 2.20 2.32 2.26
(n=13)
Council prison sentence 3.13 2.03 2.58
parole eligibility 1.76 1.32 1.54
(n=17)
Extended prison sentence 3.28 2.07 2.67
Council parole eligibility 2.21 1.38 1.80
(n=16)
Marginal means
prison sentence 3. 32 2.53
parole eligibility 2.04 1.62
Note. All entries are given in terms of years.
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interaction: F(2,43) = 3.64, £<.035). The latter
interaction becomes only marginally significant (£<.07) if 
one adjusts the probability level for the fact that two 
dependent variables were employed in the absence of a 
multivariate test. Therefore, it normally would have to be 
interpreted with caution. However, the pattern of results 
was exactly parallel for both dependent variables, rendering 
interpretation of this interaction unproblematic.
Further analyses of this interaction revealed highly 
significant simple main effects as predicted. Variablility 
was less after discussion than before in the normal council 
condition (prison: F(l,16) = 25.6; £<.001; parole:
F(l,16) = 3.12; £<.096) and for the extended council
condition (prison: F(l,15) = 11.84, £<.004; parole:
F(l,15) = 9.06, £<.009). No such differences were observed 
in the no-council condition (both F's <1). For the between 
groups analyses, planned comparisons revealed significant 
differences in post-council variability between the normal 
council and the no-council condition (multivariate F(2,42) = 
3.94, £<.027; prison: F(l,43) = 7.25, £<.01; parole:
F(l,43) = 5.53, £<.023), and between the extended council 
and the no-council condition (multivariate F(2,42) = 4.82, 
£<.013; prison: F(l,43) = 8.96, £<.005; parole: F(l,43)
= 6.62, £<.014). The predicted differences between extended 
council and normal council did not obtain (all F's <1).
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Variability Across Councils
Whereas the previous analyses focussed on the reduction 
of variability within councils (i.e. a lower level of 
analysis), it was also of interest whether the council 
intervention had any impact with regard to the over-all 
across-council variability (a higher level of analysis). 
Again, data are reported separately for the between-groups 
and the repeated measures parts of the design.
Between-groups Analyses.
Originally, it was planned to conduct a series of 
homogeneity of variance tests between the no-council and the 
two council conditions. However, the high correlations 
observed between the cell means and the respective cell 
standard deviations for both prison sentences (£=.990) and 
parole eligibility (£=.866) do not warrant these analyses 
with the given data because the differences in variances may 
be due to their relative positions on the scales rather than 
reflect true differences. Table 3 shows the cell means and 
standard deviations for the posttest scores of prison 
sentence and parole eligibility.
Whereas the pattern of the standard deviations of the 
pretested participants was consistent with the reduction of 
variability hypothesis, the results for the non-pretested 
participants was out-of-line with these predictions. In 
fact, prison sentences and parole eligibility measures in 
the no-pretest council condition were much more variable
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Table 3
Cell means and standard deviations of the 
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions 
for posttest scores (N = 277)
Council Pretest No Pretest
Conditions M S M S
Dependent
Variable
No prison sentence 5.20 3.67 4.46 3.07




Council prison sentence 4.90 3.36 6.60 5.30




Extended prison sentence 4.60 3.02 4.51 3.23




Note. All entries are given in terms of years.
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Table 4
Cell coefficients of variation (s/M) of the 
prison sentence and parole eligibility measures 
for posttest scores (N = 277)
Council
Conditions Pretest No Pretest
Dependent
Variable
No prison sentence .706 .688
Council parole eligibility .823 .849
(n=40) (n=45)
Council prison sentence .686 .803
parole eligibility .657 . 793
(n=51) (n=4 8)
Extended prison sentence .657 .716
Council parole eligibility .744 .731
(n=4 8) (n=4 5)
Note. The coefficient of variation is defined as the ratio of the
standard deviation and the mean (s/M).
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Table 5
Cell means and standard deviations of the 
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions before and after 
council discussion / opinion-writing (N = 139)
Council Before After
Conditions M s M S
Dependent
Variable
No prison sentence 4.99 3.67 5.20 3.67
Council parole eligibility 2.68 2.24 2.95 2.43
(n=40)
Council prison sentence 4.61 3.61 4.90 3.36
parole eligibility 2.60 1.81 2.89 1.90
(n=51)
Extended prison sentence 4.50 3.62 4.60 3.02
Council parole eligibility 2.80 2.57 2.77 2.06
(n=4 8)
Note. All entries are given in terms of years.
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council condition: F(l,46) = 5.93, £<.018; council
condition: F(1,49)<1, n.s.; no-council condition: F(l,38)
= 2.02, n.s.). However, these analyses are to be 
interpreted with caution because (a) the probability levels 
have to be halved to control for experimentwise error, and 
(b) the means and standard deviations are also moderately 
correlated although not as highly so as in the 
between-groups analyses (prison sentence: £=.356; parole
eligibility: £=.420). The same pattern of results is
obtained with coefficients of variation (see Table 6).
Taken together, these findings tentatively indicate 
that across-council variability was significantly reduced as 
a function of the extended council intervention but not as a 
function of the normal council or opinion-writing 
(no-council) intervention.
Leniency/Severity Shifts
Also of interest is the possibility of leniency or 
severity shifts as a function of group discussion.
Generally, shifts in mean sentences are used as an indicator
of leniency or severity shifts. However, the overall 
distribution as well as almost all of the within-cell 
frequency distributions for the prison sentence and the 
parole eligibility scores were found to be positively skewed 
(i.e. the mean was almost always larger than the median). 
Therefore, it is important to look at the means and the 
medians conjointly. Table 7 displays the cell means and
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Table 6
Cell coefficients of variation (s/M) of the 
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions before and after 





No prison sentence .735 .706
Council parole eligibility . 836 .824
(n=4 0) (n=4 5)
Council prison sentence .783 .686
parole eligibility .696 .658
(n=51) (n=48)
Extended prison sentence .804 .657
Council parole eligibility .918 .744
(n=4 8) (n=45)
Note. The coefficient of variation is defined as the ratio of the
standard deviation and the mean (s/M).
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Table 7
Cell means and medians of the 
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions





































Note. All entries are given in terms of years.
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medians of the prison and parole eligibility measures for 
posttest scores, and Table 8 displays the means and medians 
for the before and after council discussion / 
opinion-writing conditions, respectively.
The data in the two tables reveal no reliable 
systematic pattern that could be considered indicative of a 
leniency or a severity shift as a function either of council 
discussion or a pretest effect. The only striking findings 
are the relatively high means for prison sentence and parole 
eligibility decisions obtained in the no-pretest council 
condition (see Table 7). However, closer inspection of the 
data in this cell reveals that this finding is due primarily 
to one council,- in which all three members gave the highest 
possible sentences (20 years). In all the other conditions, 
only one other possible 20-year sentence was given. This 
cell of the design also contained three members who gave 
sentences of 15 years whereas a 15 year sentence was given 
by only one other participant in the experiment. The data 
for the parole eligibility measure parallel this finding:
Of the fourteen harshest parole decisions (i.e. parole 
eligibility after eight or ten years) eight were observed in 
this cell of the design.
Thus, the general leniency and severity shifts obtained 
by other investigators were not observed in this study. 
Therefore, analyses of the other dependent variables that 
were originally planned to assist in the interpretation of 
potential leniency or severity shifts are unnecessary.
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Table 8
Cell means and medians of the 
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions before and after 
council discussion / opinion-writing (N = 139)
Council Before After
Conditions M Md M Md
Dependent
Variable
No prison sentence 4.99 4.81 5.20 4.86
Council parole eligibility 2.68 2.05 2.95 2.25
(n=40)
Council prison sentence 4.61 4.77 4.90 4.67
parole eligibility 2.60 2.40 2.89 2.71
(n=51)
Extended prison sentence 4.50 3.25 4.60 4.25
Council parole eligibility 2.80 2.00 2.77 2.75
(n=4 8)
Note. All entries are given in terms of years.
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Participants' ratings of confidence in their prison sentence 
and parole eligibility decisions are reported below.
Changes in Prison Sentence and Parole Eligibility Decisions 
as a Function of Council Discussion [_ Opinion-writinq
In the repeated-measures part of the design it is 
possible to assess changes in the prison sentence and parole 
eligibility measures as a function of the council 
discussion / opinion-writing intervention. Table 9 shows 
the frequencies with which change (no change / increase / 
decrease) occurred in the various experimental conditions.
Overall, 46.8% of the participants changed their prison 
sentence, and 52.5% changed their parole eligibility 
decision between the first and second assessment. Changes 
occurred more frequently in both of the council conditions 
than in the opinion-writing condition, although changes in 
the latter condition were also unexpectedly frequent 
(chi-square tests for the no-council vs. the combined 
council conditions were significant for both the prison 
sentence: x2 (1) = 5.43, £<.02, and the parole eligibility
measure: X 2 (1) = 4.27, £<.05). Generally, among the 
participants who changed, increases in both prison sentence 
and parole eligibility measures tended to be more frequent 
than decreases across all conditions (cf. Table 9). These 
differences were significant for the paarole eligibility 
measure (x2 (l) = 6.04, £<.02), and marginally significant 
for the prison sentences (x2 (1) = 3.46, £<.07).
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
64
Table 9
Frequency of changes in the prison sentence and 
parole eligibility decisions as a function of the 
council discussion / opinion-writing intervention (N = 139)
Council
Conditions No Change Increase Decrease
Dependent
Variable
No prison sentence 28 70.0% 7 17.5% 5 12.5%
Council parole eligibility 25 62.5% 10 25.0% 5 12.5%
(n=40)
Council prison sentence 18 35.3% 21 41.2% 12 23.5%
parole eligibility 20 39.2% 20 39.2% 11 21.6%
(n=51)
Extended prison sentence 28 58.3% 12 25.0% 8 16;7%
Council parole eligibility 21 43.8% 17 35.4% 10 20.8%
(n=4 8)
Total prison sentence 74 53.2% 40 28.8% 25 18.0%
parole eligibility 66 47.5% 47 33. 8% 26 18. 7%
Note. Entries denote the frequencies with which judges did not change/ 
increased/decreased the number of years of imprisonment, and the number 
of years after which the defendent was to be eligible for parole.
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Changes in Prison Sentence and Parole Eligibility Decisions 
as a Function of Confidence in the First Decision 
Changes in prison sentence and parole eligibility 
decisions were also systematically related to the degree of 
confidence participants expressed in their first prison 
sentence and parole eligibility decision. The best 
indicator of this relationship is the biserial correlation 
(Ferguson, 1976) between participants' confidence ratings 
and the occurrence of change in their decisional behavior. 
Table 10 shows the within-cell biserial correlation 
coefficients for the no-council, council, and extended 
council conditions.
The negative correlations indicate that participants 
who were less confident in their original decision were 
generally more likely to change their decision after the 
experimental interventions. This relationship occurred 
clearly in both the no-council and the council condition 
(all coefficients were highly significant) but it was not 
evident in the extended council condition.
Changes in Decision Confidence 
Besides the relationship between confidence ratings and 
likelihood of decision change it was also of interest 
whether individuals' confidence in their decision would 
change as a function of the council discussion / 
opinion-writing interventions. Two 2X3X2 ANOVA's, with two 
between-subjects factors (subject sex X council) and one
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Table 10
Within-cell biserial correlation coefficients 
between confidence in the original decision and





r £ less than
No prison sentence -.404 .005
Council
(n=40)
parole eligibility -.416 .005
Council prison sentence -.319 .025
(n=51)
parole eligibility -.562 .001
Extended prison sentence -.044 n. s .
Council
(n=48)
parole eligibility -.142 n. s .
Note. All ratings are on a scale from 0 (not at all confident) to 
10 (extremely confident). Number of participants are in parentheses.
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within-subjects factor (time: before/after council
discussion / opinion-writing) were conducted on the 
confidence ratings for the prison sentence and parole 
eligibility decisions. Table 11 shows the mean ratings of 
confidence in prison sentence and parole eligibility 
decisions before and after council discussion / 
opinion-wr iting.
Both ANOVA's yielded highly significant main effects 
for the time factor but no significant effects for the 
expected time X council interaction. Confidence ratings 
were much higher after the experimental interventions than 
before (confidence in prison decision: before: M = 5.12,
after: M = 6.43, F(l,133) = 70.11, £<.001; confidence in
the parole decision: before: M = 5.53, after: M = 6.60,
F (1,133) = 40.62, £<.001).
Ratings of confidence in the prison sentence decision 
showed a subject sex X time interaction that reached 
significance (F(l,133) = 3.90, £<.05), indicating a stronger 
increase in confidence for females than for males. The sex 
of subject main effect was marginally significant (F(l,133)
= 3.42, £<.067).
Ratings of confidence in the parole eligibility 
decision, produced a significant main effect for subject sex 
with males as a group (M = 6.45) displaying more confidence 
than females (M = 5.68, F(l,133) = 4.15, £<.044). The 
subject sex X council X time interaction was also 
significant (F(2,133) = 3.99, £<.021), apparently due to the
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Table 11 
Mean ratings of confidence in 
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions before and after 
council discussion / opinion-writing (N = 139)
Council Confidence Before After
Conditions Male Female Male Female
No prison sentence 5.33 4.05 6.39 5.95
Council parole eligibility 6.78 3.77 7.11 5. 77
■
(18) (22) (18) (22)
Council prison sentence 5.84 4.54 6.80 6.08
parole eligibility 5.28 5.35 7.12 6.42
(25) (26) (25) (26)
Extended prison sentence 5. 74 5.10 6.74 6.52
Council parole eligibility 6.11 6.05 6.78 6.81
(27) (21) (27) (21)
Marginal means
prison decision 5.67 4.55 6.82 6.06
parole eligibility 5.99 5.06 6.91 6.31
Note. All ratings are on a scale from 0 (not at all confident) to 
10 (extremely confident). Number of participants are in parentheses.
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large initial differences between males and females in the 
no-council condition (see Table 11). However, the subject 
sex effects, and their interactions, need to be interpreted 
with caution. Because there were no multivariate tests 
conducted with the repeated measures design, the probability 
levels for the two dependent variables have to be halved, 
rendering all these effects at best marginally significant.
Predicting Prison Sentence and Parole Eligibility 
Decisions from General Dispositions
The overall design of this study can be split up into 
two groups of participants. At the beginning of the 
experiment, one group (the so-called "pretest" group) was 
administered the Sentencing Philosophy Scale, the other 
group (the so-called "no pretest group") was given the 
Authoritarianism Scale (F Scale). Forward stepwise multiple 
regression analyses were performed for both groups to 
investigate how well the scores from the individual measures 
of the Sentencing Philosophy Scale and the total F test 
predicted individual participants' posttest scores on the 
prison sentence and parole eligibility measures.
Of the five Sentencing Philosophy Scale measures, only 
the first two accounted for more than one percent of the 
variance of the prison sentence decisions (belief in the 
importance of special deterrence: 1.2%, v_ = .109; belief
in the importance of punishment: 1.1%, t_ = -.090;
together: 2.3%). Prediction of the parole eligibility
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decisions was somewhat better, with the belief in the 
importance of incapacitation accounting for 2.2% (£ = .150), 
and the belief in the importance of special deterrence (£ = 
.144) and of punishent (£ = .114) accounting for additional 
1.8 and 1.1% of the variance, respectively (together:
5.2%) .
The total score of the Authoritarianism Scale accounted 
for 2.5% of the prison sentence decisions (£ = .157), and 
4.3% of the parole eligibility decisions (£ = .207). 
Generally, among the participants who changed, increases in 
both prison sentence and parole eligibility measures tended 
to be more frequent than decreases across all conditions 
(cf. Table 9). These differences were significant for the 
paarole eligibility measure ( (1) = 6.04, £<.02), and
marginally significant for the prison sentences ( (1) =
3.46, £< .07) .
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CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION
Reduction of Variability 
The findings of this laboratory simulation strongly and 
reliably indicate that group discussion is an effective 
means for reducing within-council variability in sentencing 
behavior. The nature of the Solomon-four-group design, and 
the extension of that design employed in this study, allows 
for several independent replications of this effect within a 
single study (Campbell & Stanley, 1966). As predicted, the 
sentencing behavior of the mock judges was substantially 
less variable after discussion in both types of council, 
irrespective of whether or not judges had written their 
sentences prior to discussion.
This finding replicates Zimmerman's (1976) findings 
with different case materials and extends them. The present 
study demonstrated, like Zimmerman's study, that 
post-discussion sentences were less variable not only when 
judges had put down their initial sentencing suggestions on 
paper but also when they had entered discussion without yet 
having written them down. In fact, data clearly indicated 
that judges' post-discussion sentencing behavior was
71
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substantially less variable when they had not committed 
themselves through writing. Although there are no data from 
this experiment that explain why this commitment effect 
occurred, several areas of research in social psychology 
have generated data consistent with it.
Both the literatures on attitude change (e.g. Kiesler, 
1971; Kiesler, Collins, & Miller, 1969) and on conformity 
(e.g. Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) would lead one to expect that 
commitment to a particular position (in this case writing 
down a prison sentence) would render one more resistent to 
influence attempts (e.g. in the group discussion) and 
therefore would reduce the likelihood of change in position 
at the second assessment. In the current study the 
commitment toward consistency was not terribly strong, as 
indicated by the relatively high frequencies of change 
observed as a function of discussion in both council 
conditions, and even as a function of opinion-writing in the 
no-council condition. A commitment effect also can be 
expected on the basis of a study by Pepitone & DiNubile 
(1976) of defendants. That study demonstrated that the 
public recording of ratings and punishments created an 
anchoring of these judgments.
If one focusses on the no-pretest conditions, the 
observed effect also lends support to the interpretation 
that the defendant was perceived as an ambiguous stimulus 
object. One may also speculate that the stronger 
convergence toward the mean (although not directly
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observable in the no-pretest condition) reflects a norm 
formation process typical of the judgmental processes 
observed in the Sherif tradition (Sherif, 1935, 1936;
Sherif & Sherif, 1969). It is easier for judges to arrive 
at a common norm (i.e. an appropriate sentence) when they 
are not yet committed through their pre-council decision.
The tentative nature of these speculations about the 
underlying causal processes, in the absence of direct data 
within this study, must be emphasized. Moreover, in places 
the data are inconsistent with these interpretations. For 
example, these speculations do not explain why there was 
only a main effect for the pretest but no significant 
council X pretest interaction. One would expect such an 
interaction on the basis of the theorizing advanced here.
Of course, the difference in within-council variability in 
the no-council conditions is necessarily due to chance as 
the triplets were constituted post-hoc through 
randomization.
It should also be noted that there were no significant 
differences in reduction of within-council variability 
between the normal sentencing council in which judges 
discussed prison sentences and parole eligibility and the 
extended sentencing council in which judges also discussed 
the goals of judicial sentencing in general terms. In other 
words, the discussion of sentencing goals did not lead to a 
reduction of within-council variability over and above the 
reduction achieved through the discussion of sentences and
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the reasons for the sentences. It is likely that mock 
judges also discussed the sentencing "goals" when they were 
asked to discuss the "reasons" for their prison sentence and 
parole eligibility decisions. There is evidence that the 
extended sentencing council was effective in reducing 
overall variability across judges (see below).
Generally, however, the hypothesis regarding reduction 
of variability across judges did not fare as well as the one 
regarding reduction of variability within councils. These 
data do not indicate that variability in decision-making 
across all judges was reduced as a function of the council 
intervention. The only exception was the significant 
before-after reduction of variability observed for both 
dependent measures as a function of discussion in the 
extended sentencing councils in which judges discussed 
general sentencing goals in addition to prison sentences and 
eligibility for parole. Thus, Sporer's (1980b) findings 
regarding reduction of variability across judges was 
replicated in the extended council condition but not in the 
normal council condition.
A variety of reasons can be offered to account for this 
difference in findings. Whereas in the present study mock 
judges judged a defendant convicted of armed robbery, the 
previous study involved the judgment of a case of rape which 
generally is considered a much more serious crime (cf.
Coombs, 1967; Sporer, 1978, 1979, 1980a). The response 
scales in the rape study ranged from zero to fifty years (as
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opposed to zero to twenty years in the present 
investigation) allowing for much greater initial overall 
variability which was reduced as a function of the 
discussion intervention. Of course, the fact that the first 
study involved law students whereas this study was conducted 
with college students could also account for the difference 
in findings.
In sum, the present study indicates that sentencing 
councils may be a very effective means to reduce 
within-council variability, especially when judges do not 
write down their sentences beforehand. However, the 
evidence that sentencing councils may also reduce 
variability across a large number of judges is at this point 
equivocal. Future research should focus on the question of 
whether or not overall reduction of variability might be 
restricted to some controversial cases in which the original 
distribution of sentences is generally widely spread as well 
as on which discussion formats are most likely to reduce 
overall variability.
Penalty Shifts and Patterns of Change.
The penalty shifts (leniency and/or severity shifts) 
observed by previous investigators as a function of group 
discussion both in legal settings and in the laboratory (cf. 
the review of the literature in Chapter IV) were not 
obtained in the present study. Neither the polarization 
hypothesis, nor the leniency ypothesis a laboratory artifact
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created by selective was supported by these data. In fact, 
the overall higher frequency to increase, rather than 
decrease, the penalties observed in both council conditions 
as well as in the opinion-writing condition (cf. Table 9) 
might be more indicative of a severity shift that is not 
restricted to group discussion.
Thus, the leniency shift observed by other 
investigators appears to remain a relatively unstable 
phenomenon that is likely to be case-specific, or, worse, an 
artifact due to selective reporting and publication (cf. 
Greenwald, 1975). It is also possible that the jury 
simulation paradigm, which has produced the majority of the 
reported leniency shifts is genuinely different from the 
sentencing council simulation paradigm employed here. For 
example, role-playing a juror may activate different values 
than role-playing a judge. These values of jurors may be 
more easily enhanced by group discussion (Lamm & Myers,
1978). Concretely, jury simulations that require both the 
finding of a verdict and the giving of a sentence may be 
dominated by the "innocent until proven guilty" Kalven & 
Zeisel, 1966) and the "beyond a reasonable doubt" norms 
emphasized by the American judicial system and particularly 
strongly espoused by American college students (Silzer & 
Clark, 1978; cf. also Cvetkovich & Baumgardner, 1973; 
Rumsey, 1980) while judicial sentencing simulations may be 
more likely to elicit quite different considerations (e.g. 
"safety in the streets," or, conversely,
g
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"rehabilitation— not warehousing," see Sporer, 1980a).
These differential values may then become intensified during 
group discussion, and thus lead to either leniency, 
severity, or polarization shifts (cf. also Cvetkovich & 
Baumgardner, 1973). Future investigators would be wise to 
distinguish more specifically between these paradigms (cf. 
Sporer, 1978, 1979, 1980a and b; Vidmar, 1979; Weiten & 
Diamond, 1979). They will also have to specify more 
precisely the conditions (e.g. case characteristics, mode 
of discussion and decision-making etc.) under which penalty 
shifts (leniency and/or severity) are expected to occur.
These suggestions are not meant to imply that leniency 
and/or severity shifts remain a possibility we will have to 
reckon with. Instead, it appears that the sentencing 
paradigm does not allow for a satisfactory definition of a 
subjective neutral point against which polarization 
(leniency and/or severity shifts) can be referenced (cf. 
Myers & Lamm, 1976; Rumsey, 1980) . Therefore, the 
polarization hypothesis cannot be tested effectively within 
this framework. Generally, the results seem more indicative 
of an "averaging effect" (Baron & Roper, 1977), i.e. 
convergence toward the mean typical of judgments of 
ambiguous stimuli in the Sherif tradition (see Hofstatter, 
1971; Moscovici, 1974; Jenness, 1932; Sherif, 1935, 1936; 
Sherif & Sherif, 1969). This averaging effect is restricted 
to the council conditions of the experiment in which most of 
the changes occurred, and therefore appears to have been a
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true group (or at least an information exchange) phenomenon.
It should be noted, however, that there was also a 
sizable number of changes (30% percent in the prison 
sentence and 37.5% in the parole eligibility decisions) in 
the no-council condition in which judges wrote a sentencing 
opinion but did not discuss the case with fellow judges. 
Theories of group processes cannot account for these 
changes. Of course, these changes simply may be 
attributable to chance. But this probably holds only for a 
few cases. For the majortiy of these changes we should 
search for a better explanation.
Recent theorizing and research on "self-generated 
attitude change" (Tesser, 1978; Tesser & Conlee, 1975) may 
shed some light on some of these processes. Adopting a more 
dynamic view of attitudes, these authors postulate that
(a) for various stimulus domains persons have 
naive theories or schemas which make some 
attributes of the stimuli salient and provide 
rules for inferences regarding other attributes;
(b) thought, under the direction of a schema, 
produces changes in beliefs, and these changes are 
often in the direction of greater schematic and 
evaluative consistency; (c) attitudes are a 
function of one's beliefs. Since thought tends to 
make beliefs more evaluatively consistent and 
attitudes are a function of beliefs, thought will 
tend to polarize attitudes. (Tesser, 1978, p.
290)
As these writers use the terms attitude, evaluation, 
and affect interchangeably (Tesser, 1978, n.3), sentencing 
judgments may be encompassed by their general theory. As 
applied to the present study, judges would be supposed to 
invoke certain schemata about the defendant as a function of
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reading about the defendant e.g. "he was armed— he must be 
a dangerous criminal", or, conversely, "he pleaded 
guilty— he must be somewhat honest?"). Consequently, as a 
function of further thought (writing the sentencing 
opinion), these schemata, according to the theory, generate 
further cognitions consistent with these schemata (e.g. "he 
could have fired the gun and killed the store-owner") , or 
reinterpret inconsistent cognitions (e.g. "even though he 
is a repeat offender, we don't know the circumstances; he 
deserves another chance if he shows signs of 
rehabilitation"). Accumulation of these cognitions would 
lead to a "polarization" of the evaluative response in the 
direction of the initial response. It should be noted that 
these processes may also take place in the group 
discussions, capturing some of the variance of changes 
observed there.
As plausible as this post hoc explanation appears on 
inspection of the judges' sentencing-opinions, it cannot be 
adequately tested with the present data. The major 
difficulty parallels the one encountered with the group 
polarization hypothesis noted above: There is no definable
subjective neutral point against which polarization could be 
referenced. Future research could investigate this 
possibility through the construction of cases that differ in 
the kinds of schemas they tend to invoke (as determined 
through pretesting).
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It must be emphasized that the postulation of these 
processes is highly speculative, and more suggestive of 
avenues for future research than a serious explanation for 
the opinion changes in the present data. It should also be 
remembered that the sentencing opinions were generally 
rather balanced, weighing both pros and cons, and in the
majority of cases did not lead to changes.
Confidence in Sentencing and Parole Decisions 
Discussed above were several theoretical processes 
which could account for the decision changes observed. It 
is also possible to relate these changes to the confidence 
judges exhibited in their original prison sentence and 
parole eligibility decisions. Levels of confidence were 
originally very widely distributed across the whole scale, 
and were generally good predictors for the likelihood of 
change in the opinion-writing and normal council condition 
but curiously not for the extended council condition. There
is no explanation for the absence of a significant
relationship between decision confidence and likelihood of 
change in the latter condition. In the other two 
conditions, judges who indicated lower levels of confidence 
in their original decisions were generally more likely to 
change their decisions than judges who displayed more 
confidence in their decisions.
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Also of interest is the impact of the experimental 
manipulations upon judges' decision confidence. Clearly, 
discussion in the sentencing councils as well as sentencing 
opinion writing boosted the judges' confidence both in their 
prison sentence and parole eligibility decisions. The 
impact tended to be somewhat stronger with females than with 
males, largely due to the fact that males tended to be more 
confident in their decisions initially. This pattern of 
results makes sense in light of the fact that participants 
were asked to role-play judges who (at least at the time of 
this writing) are more likely to be males than females.
Predicting Decision Outcomes from General Dispositions 
The small amount of variance of the prison sentence and 
parole eligibility decisions accounted for by the Sentencing 
Philosophy Scale and the Authoritarianism Scale (F Scale) is 
disappointing. It reflects just another instance of an 
issue both personality psychologists and social 
psychologists have struggled with for decades: The
inability to predict specific behaviors from more general 
dispositions. The disillusionment with the trait approach 
in the psychology of personality (e.g. Mischel, 1968), and 
the perennial revivals of the attitude-behavior consistency 
controversies (e.g. LaPiere, 1932; Wicker, 1969) attest to 
this point.
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A comparison of the behaviors elicited by the two 
attitude questionnaires (Sentencing Philosophy Scale and F
Scale) and the measures of sentencing decisions can help us
understand the weak relationships observed. For example, 
the F Scale measures general personality dispositions / 
attitudes presumed to be fairly consistent over time and 
situations while the judgment of a criminal offender is much 
more under the control of a particular stimulus situation 
(i.e. the particular case characteristics as well as the 
situational context). Of course, this somewhat contradicts 
the analogy of the defendant as an ambiguous stimulus object 
which would lead one to expect that internal factors would 
exert a more potent influence on sentencing judgments (e.g. 
Sherif & Sherif, 1969). Present data, however, suggest that 
the F Scale is not systematically related to the judgments 
in this particular stimulus domain, at least for the 
population sampled, and therefore that it does not 
adequately assess these underlying factors.
The lack of a relationship between the mock judges' 
scores on the Sentencing Philosophy Scale and the sentencing 
decisions is, at least on the surface level, more 
disappointing. It is likely that it is due to the lack of 
discriminatory power of the items on this questionnaire.
Most participant mock judges endorsed almost all of the five 
sentencing goals (punishment, general deterrence, special 
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation) as more or 
less important. Thus, they did not display the level of
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variability that is a prereqisite for a good predictor. The 
lack of predictive utility of the Sentencing Philosophy 
Scale runs counter to Hogarth's (1971) study of Canadian 
sentencing magistrates. He found judges to vary greatly 
with regard to the sentencing goals they endorsed, which in 
turn captured a major portion of the variance of their 
sentencing decisions. Recent laboratory investigations by 
McFatter (1979) and Austin (1979) also demonstrated the 
importance of selective sentencing goals for the 
determination of levels of punishment. Therefore, the lack 
of a relationship between the Sentencing Philosophy Scale 
and the actual sentencing decisions found in this study 
could be attributed to the lack of differentiation of 
sentencing goals in the population of college students 
sampled. It is possible that the lack of experience of mock 
judges has prevented them from developing the relevant 
schemata (cf. Stotland & Canon, 1972; Tesser, 1978) that 
typically would be expected to be well-represented in real 
j udges.
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CHAPTER VIII
VALIDITY AND IMPLICATIONS
Inductive Approaches to Validity:
Population and Ecolocical Validity 
The present experiment was designed to contribute to 
the solution of a social problem observed in courts: The
issue of sentencing disparity. Before drawing any 
conclusions on the basis of this research regarding 
applicability to real world problems it is vital that we 
come to grips with a fundamental issue facing all laboratory 
research on legal issues: The relationship between
laboratory research and the actual behavior of legal actors 
in legal settings.
Traditionally, this question is couched in the language 
of generalizability (or external validity): How much can we
generalize from this laboratory simulation to the real world 
of the courtroom? More specifically: How much can we
generalize from the sample under study (college students) to 
the target population of judges (population validity), and 
how much can we generalize from the context of the 
laboratory setting to the actual legal setting (ecological 
validity; cf. Bracht & Glass, 1968, regarding this
84
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distinction). Consequently, according to this view, the 
external validity of experimental laboratory simulations is 
measured on the criteria of how representative their 
participants are of the target population, and how closely 
they simulate the actual legal context.
The present study does not fare well _if evaluated 
against these criteria. College student mock judges are 
several steps removed from the highly specific, narrowly 
circumscribed target population of sentencing judges. 
Sentencing judges are a subgroup of the population that 
differs in age, educational level, legal socialization 
(Levine & Tapp, 1977; cf. also Erlanger & Klegon, 1978) 
and in many other ways from college students. These 
differences in legal expertise are likely to precipitate 
some differences in decision-making processes. For example, 
Konecni and Ebbesen (1979) found judges, probation offecers, 
and college students to differ with respect to some of the 
factors that seemed to have influenced their decisions in a 
simulation experiment on judicial sentencing. Judges may 
also be influenced by their past decisions in relatively 
similar— or different— cases during their experience on the 
bench (cf. also Pepitone & DiNubile, 1976) .
Relatedly, Sporer (1980a) found that law students who 
could be seen as somewhat intermediate between these two 
populations on these dimensions, differed from college 
students with regard to their general punitiveness (they 
were less so). Moreover, law students and college students
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were differentially affected by some of the case 
characteristics under investigation. Generally, selection X 
treatment interactions, as observed in that study, pose 
serious threats to external validity of these types of 
studies (Campbell & Stanley, 1966; Cook & Campbell, 1979).
However, despite these general attitudinal differences 
and the differential impact of some of the case 
characteristics, in that same study, there were striking 
similarities to the present study in the reduction of 
variability in sentencing behavior which occurred as a 
function of group discussion. Similarly, Zimmerman's (1976) 
simulation of sentencing councils with law students found 
reliable reduction of variability as a function of group 
discussion. Procedurally, his study differed significantly 
from both Sporer's (1980b) and the present study.
An important consideration in evaluating the use of 
nonexpert decision makers as participants in simulations of 
sentencing studies is that the logical alternative, i.e. to 
use real judges, may be fraught with even more 
interpretational difficulties. For example, judges would be 
likely to be well aware of the disparity problem, and 
therefore, would be likely to refrain from any extreme 
judgments or any form of socially or legally undesirable 
bias under the scrutinous observation of the scientist 
representing the eye of the public (cf. Diamond & Zeisel, 
1975) . Consequently, their behavior in a simulation 
experiment may not at all reflect the nature of their
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behavior in the courtroom. We know from studies on bail 
decision-making that judges are likely to respond in a 
socially desirable fashion to questionnaires (Ebbesen & 
Konecni, 1975; cf. also Konecni & Ebbesen, 1979). To 
conduct the present study with real judges, without creating 
awareness of the experimental hypotheses, and the 
concomitant response biases, would no doubt be extremely 
difficult.
The ecological validity of the present study is also 
rather limited. Besides the obvious dissimilarities between 
the set-up of this study and a.n actual courtroom, all 
laboratory simulations of judicial sentencing have to face 
their most serious short-coming: The so-called
"paper-defendant" problem (Partridge & Eldridge, 1974). The 
sentence is given to a hypothetical defendant who exists 
only on paper, i.e. (1) without the face-to-face contact 
characteristic of the sentencing hearing, and (2) without 
any real consequences for a real person— e.g. the 
vicissitudes of long-term incarceration (cf. also Austin & 
Utne, 1977; Austin & Williams, 1977). Although it seemed 
that participants in this experiment took their task as 
judges quite seriously, one should not generalize directly 
from the results of this experiment to the sentencing 
behavior of judges.
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Deductive Approaches to Validity and
Criteria of Research
It was never the aim of this study to provide for
direct generalization to the courtroom. But we should not
approach generalizability this way. Implicit in these
conceptions of external validity (population and ecological
validity as discussed) is an inductivist view of science
(Gadenne, 1976; however, Cook & Campbell deny this) which
is no longer tenable from a philosophy of science point of
view (Hempel, 1966; Popper, 1959). Alternative ways to
conceptualize these issues, based on a deductive,
theory-testing approach, are available (e.g. Gadenne, 1976;
Irle, 1975; Kruglanski & Kroy, 1976). Such deductive
approaches have recently been adopted to the social
psychology of legal issues (cf. Opp, 1970) . Lind and
Walker (1979) make this point most succinctly:
We also argue below that empirical studies 
designed to test specific theories of legal 
behavior are not evaluated properly by the 
simulation-oriented criterion of methodological 
closeness to some actual setting and population.
Rather, such studies should be judged with 
reference to the theoretical principles they seek 
to test. A study designed for theory-testing 
purposes is good to the extent that it provides an 
unambiguous test of some essential implication of 
the theory. Practical application of the results 
of this sort of study is not accomplished 
directly, but comes rather from the application of 
the theory itself to legal questions. (p. 6)
Although their statement also applies to the present
study, an important difference should be noted. They are in
a much better position because they can rest their argument
on a well-grounded theory of legal behavior, viz. their
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theory of procedure (Thibaut & Walker, 1978). Yet there is 
no single well-developed legal or psychological theory of 
discretion or group decision-making that could be used as an 
encompassing framework for the present study.
Rather, we have to choose from a whole gamut of 
theories some of which may o may not apply. Therefore, 
additional criteria of research become necessary. Besides 
the traditional criteria of scientific research put forth by 
philosophers of science, e.g. logical consistency, 
falsifiability etc. (cf. Groeben & Westmeyef, 1975), the 
criteria of technical and emancipatory relevance (Habermas, 
1965; Holzkamp, 1972; Sporer, 1980c) can help us decide 
among alternative theories. The present approach has 
adopted an interventionist paradigm that chooses among 
theories not only on the basis of their value in generating 
understanding the problem of sentencing disparity but also 
their potential in pointing out ways to reduce it. For 
example, general theories of norm formation (e.g.
Moscovici, 1974; Sherif, 1935, 1936; Sherif & Sherif,
1969) that would lead one to expect an averaging effect 
(Baron & Roper, 1977) as a function of group discussion, or 
theories of group polarization (see Lamm & Myers, 1978) that 
would predict penalty shifts, were preferred to theories 
that would not imply the possibilities of strucutral 
interventions / innovations.
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Construct and Dependent Variable Validity 
However, this theory-oriented approach does not rid us 
of our responsibility to discuss validity issues in more 
detail within this deductive framework. In particular, 
construct validity (Cook & Campbell, 1979; cf. Kruglanski 
& Kroy's, 1979, independent variable, dependent variable, 
and effect validity) and dependent variable validity 
(Kruglanski & Kroy, 1976) need to be further elaborated. 
With regard to construct validity of the postulated causal 
relationship between group discussion and reduction of 
variability, there is now accumulated evidence that the 
normalization processes (averaging effect) expected from 
theory (e.g. Moscovici, 1974) are likely to operate in 
sentencing councils as well. Zimmerman (1976), Sporer 
(1980b) and this dissertation all support this position 
through constructive replications with different case 
materials, different experimental procedures (and different 
participant populations). Moreover, converging evidence 
from anecdotal reports and archival analyses of courts 
employing sentencing councils (see Chapters III and IV) 
satisfy the requirement of multiple operationism (Campbell & 
Stanley, 1966; Cook & Campbell, 1979). Such evidence, 
despite the short comings, increases our confidence that 
these processes may well operate in the field as well as in 
the laboratory.
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Further evidence for construct validity is provided by 
the finding indicating that the reduction of variability 
effect was stronger for unpretested than for pretested 
councils, by indicating differential effects for 
differential manipulations (cf. Cook & Campbell's idea of 
"divergence between manipulations," 1979, p. 61). The 
pretest effect also provides support for the operation of 
norm formation processes which would lead one to expect 
lesser variability when judgments are started with the group 
than when starting with individuals (Sherif, 1935).
The issue of dependent variable validity (Kruglanski & 
Kroy, 1976) needs also to be discussed. In many ways this 
issue resembles the "paper defendant" problem discussed 
above within the framework adopted of ecological validity. 
However, the deductive framework here sheds new light on 
this issue. It also highlights the differences between 
these approaches. For example, based on the criterion of 
"closeness to the actual legal setting," as demanded by 
ecological validity, one would attempt to provide sentencing 
alternatives to mock judges that portray the sentencing 
alternatives available in the actual legal setting as 
faithfully as possible. This may work with legally 
sophisticated simulation participants, e.g. advanced law 
students or real judges, but it also could distort the 
response pattern of legally less sophisticated participants 
(e.g. college students). For example, the present study 
employed the term "parole eligibility after X Number of
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years" which was to indicate to legally unsophisticated mock 
judges the number of years after which the defendant could, 
at the earliest time, be released from prison. For legally 
sophisticated participants, this sentencing option would 
generate much more complex computations, such as for example 
"minimum sentence minus good time credit" etc. (cf.
American Bar Association Commission on Correctional 
Facilities and Services, 1974) Yet for an adequate deductive 
test of the research propositions under question, (i.e. the 
reduction of variability or the penalty shift hypotheses) it 
is not important that participants can adequately utilize 
the whole gamut of sentencing alernatives. Rather, it is 
important that the changes in the dependent variables 
adequately reflect the changes postulated by the theory. We 
are not interested in the absolute magnitude of the 
sentences etc. proposed but in their pattern of changes as 
a function of the experimental interventions.
One major aspect of dependent variable validity, the 
"paper defendant" problem, cannot easily be overcome by 
laboratory simulations. However, we have to consider the 
alternatives. For obvious ethical and legal reasons, 
experimentation involving the fate of actual defendants is 
ruled out. This leaves us with post facto archival analyses 
which raise an entirely new set of methodological problems 
and problems of interpretation (cf. Webb et al., 1966).
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In summary, the theory-testing interventionist approach 
promulgated here provides a viable strategy to study legal 
issues and to contribute to their solution by testing the 
assumed effects of structural interventions. Its value, 
however, does not lie in its direct applicability to the 
actual legal setting but rather in the testing of theories 
which provide unambiguous insights into the (causal) 
relationships between the variables under study. These 
theories, in turn, can be fruitfully applied to the real 
world setting. Of course, this approach should be 
supplemented, whenever and wherever possible, by more 
naturalistic "proximal" simulation experiments and jLn situ 
evaluation studies (Lind, 1978) . Only through the use of 
multiple methodologies, in connection with theory, will we 
be able to arrive at an adequate understanding of and 
significant contributions to complex social problems such as 
sentencing disparity.
Implications for Pol icy 
Despite the restrictions implied by the foregoing 
discussion, it should be possible to derive some tentative 
implications for the policy of judicial sentencing. The 
massive evidence on the existence of sentencing disparity 
(see Chapter I) has made the call for solutions more urgent 
than ever. The faith of the public, and particularly of the 
subpopulation of criminal offenders, in the criminal justice 
system depends to a large extent on the perceived fairness
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(and effectiveness) of that system.
The present study has accumulated empirical evidence 
that sentencing disparity may indeed be reduced as a 
function of group discussion among council members. The 
evidence is particularly strong with regard to the reduction 
of variability within councils. There is mixed 
evidence— partial but weak support from this study, and 
stronger support from a preliminary study (Sporer,
1980b)— that council procedures may also reduce variability 
across large numbers of judges. Based on this evidence, the 
implementation of sentencing councils is recommended, at 
least for a restricted number of cases (e.g. felony cases) 
on a trial basis. Only when sentencing councils are 
instituted on a large scale basis, will we be able to 
evaluate their impact more systematically.
Of particular interest is a procedural change suggested 
for the mode of operation of sentencing councils derived 
from theories of norm formation processes and theories of 
attitude change, and supported by data from the present 
study. It is recommended that council members do not (as 
has been common practice in the few existing sentencing 
councils on which information on this point is available) 
record their recommended sentence on the so-called 
"Sentencing Study Sheet" (see Levin, 1969) but rather enter 
the discussion without having committed themselves in this 
form through writing. Theories of norm fomation and of 
attitude change and commitment, corroborated by evidence
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from the present study, indicate that writing down a 
sentence prior to discussion is likely to reduce council 
members' susceptibility to the moderating effects of the 
group. It is suggested that this procedural change be 
adopted in a systematically determined portion of the cases, 
and subjected to rigorous scientific evaluation _in situ.
The council discussion experience is also likely to 
enhance the confidence of judges in their decisions.
However, this should not be interpreted to mean that council 
members' reliance on other members' judgment would 
jeopardize their cherished independence of judgment. The 
council's function is to be seen as purely advisory. But 
the impact of the council discussion can be expected to be 
pervasive despite the stress on the independence of 
judgment, as indicated by data from this and from the 
previous study mentioned above.
However, the enthusiasm about the disparity-reducing 
quality of sentencing councils should not be overextended. 
Until it is better established that sentencing councils 
substantively reduce disparity across judges and 
jurisdictions, (and even if this were demonstrated more 
conclusively) we must search for additional means to balance 
the principles of equality before the law and flexibility in 
decision-making. Sentencing councils provide ways that 
demonstrate that these goals are not necessarily 
contradictory but can be reconciled at a higher level of 
integration. Other promising alternatives might be the
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appellate review of sentencing (see Chapter II), and 
sentencing guidelines.
Appellate review of sentencing would seem a necessary 
counterbalance to one potential problem of sentencing 
councils— extreme judgments as a function of group 
polarization. Sentencing guidelines could be fruitful to 
provide judges (and councils) the frame of reference within 
which to proceed. The theories advanced in this thesis 
could also be applied to a better understanding of the 
impact of guidelines upon sentencing decisions.
Consideration of these reform proposals should not take 
place in isolation but rather such consideration needs to be 
related to the operation of the criminal justice system as a 
system. For example, the feasibility of adoption of 
sentencing councils, as well as their potential impact upon 
the backlog of cases etc., must be carefully evaluated. It 
is argued that short-sighted economic arguments are likely 
to be detrimental to the functioning of the criminal justice 
system, and to society as a whole. Other reform proposals 
of imminent appeal, such as "flat-time sentencing" are 
likely to displace the disparity problem to other agents in 
the system, e.g. the prosecutor.
Conclusion
The empirical approach taken in this thesis can aid us 
in understanding and evaluating the actual and potential 
impact of structural legal interventions from a social
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psychological perspective. It draws heavily on the existing 
body of legal and psychological theory in pinpointing the 
processes and evaluating and predicting the outcomes of 
these interventions. But the promises of this approach need 
not be restricted to passive investigation of the status 
quo. It encompasses creative components that may provide 
the leverage point for constructive change.
Other possibly more important issues are beyond the 
scope of the present approach. They can only be resolved at 
a meta-level by philosophers or society at large. For 
example, the problem of sentencing disparity may be deeply 
rooted in the foundations of criminal sanctions in diverse 
penal philosophies. Until society at large comes to grip 
with some of these philosophical issues through democratic 
means and delineates specific behavioral prescriptions with 
regard to type and severity of criminal sanctions from 
general principles of sentencing, individual judges (and 
other societal agents) are likely to follow their own 
subjective interpretation of these abstract principles. 
Disparity ensues. Structural and procedural checks are 
needed to bridle it.
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CASE SUMMARY
In the late afternoon hours of October 10, 1975, the
defendant, twenty-eight year old George F. Watson, entered 
a small grocery store pretending to buy groceries. When the 
defendant was alone in the store with the owner he walked up 
to him and pretended to pay for a six-pack of beer. When 
Paul Gregory, 63, the owner, opened the cash register the 
defendant pulled a loaded gun and pointed it at Gregory. He 
stepped around the counter toward the register. Gregory was 
nervously shaking and was slow to move out of the way. The 
defendant pushed him aside and hurriedly emptied out the 
cash from the register. He left with a total of $345 taken 
from the store. Another customer who was just about to 
enter the store observed part of the incident through the 
shop window and immediately reported it to the police. The 
police were able to apprehend the defendant at his apartment 
soon thereafter. He was charged with armed robbery and 
pleaded guilty after he had been identified by the store 
owner and the second customer. However, the money was never 
recovered. The probation officer studied the defendant's 
police record which showed that he had been convicted of 
armed robbery once before. He therefore recommended that 
George F. Watson should be given a prison sentence.
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GOALS OF SENTENCING
1. Rehabilitation. The attempt to change the offender
through treatment or corrective measures, so that when 
given the chance he will refrain from committing crime.
2. General deterrence. The attempt to impose a penal.ty on
the offender before the court sufficiently severe that 
potential offenders among the general public will 
refrain from committing crime through the fear of 
punishment.
3. Individual deterrence. The attempt to impose a penalty
on the offender before the court sufficiently severe 
that he will refrain from committing further crime 
through fear of punishment.
4. Punishment. The attempt to impose a just punishment on
the offender, in the sense of being in proportion to 
the severity of the crime and his culpability, whether 
or not such penalty is likely to prevent further crime 
in him, or others.
5. Incapacitation. The attempt to protect society for a
period of time by removing the offender from the 
community into prison.
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